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Abstract 
As the number of Facebook users across the globe reaches over a billion, more people 
continue to make even greater use of this social network to support their daily activities and 
relationships. As a result a large amount of personal information is being generated, all of 
which provides extensive insight about Facebook users. This information is frequently 
exposed to other individuals in unexpected ways and often with severe consequences such as 
shame, embarrassment, job loss, and sometimes even arrest. Additionally, this large 
collection of users’ personal data is owned and stored by Facebook, which now exploits it for 
money through advertising, in continually changing and often bewildering ways. 
This research paper aims to address the complex and often controversial debate 
around privacy invasions, specifically with regard to Facebook and the alternative social 
network site Diaspora*. It develops a rigorous conception of privacy relevant to online social 
networks, primarily using Helen Nissenbaum’s framework of contextual integrity. This 
conception is made up of two dimensions: social privacy and institutional privacy. Social 
privacy generally covers peer-to-peer violations, while institutional privacy covers the 
relationship between Facebook and its users, specifically its practices regarding user data. 
These conceptions of privacy are used in conjunction with an analysis of Facebook’s history 
and current privacy policy and features to determine the nature of privacy violations on 
Facebook, and the extent to which Facebook is accountable. This analysis occurs in the time 
frame since Facebook’s inception in 2004 until June 2012, a month after its Initial Public 
Offering. As a comparative case study, the conception of social network privacy is used to 
assess the “Anti-Facebook” alternative social network Diaspora* to determine whether it 
successfully offers a better solution to social network privacy than Facebook does. 
This paper concludes that violations of social privacy occur on Facebook primarily 
due to the collapsing and convergence of many different contexts. Institutional privacy is 
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violated by Facebook’s continually changing, dense and bewildering data practices, which is 
exacerbated by the centralised nature of its user data store. Facebook is accountable for these 
violations principally because its default settings continually push towards increased 
information disclosure. This paper also concludes that this push is intentional, in light of 
Zuckerberg’s fanaticism about making the world more transparent, and because of the 
commercial value of Facebook’s huge personal data store.  
This paper also concludes that Diaspora* offers some improved solutions to maintain 
online privacy, primarily because of the control of data it provides to its users and because of 
its potential to promote a heterogeneous landscape of social networks that do not need to 
commercially exploit user data. However, Diaspora* introduces some further risks to 
institutional privacy, and it is asserted in this paper that some social privacy issues are 
intrinsic to online social networks, and therefore difficult to avoid. 
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Chapter One  
1.1 Introduction 
Today, almost every aspect of most of our lives is maintained online. All these 
activities breed information. On social networks, and Facebook in particular, a wide range of 
information is generated through the creation of accounts corresponding to one’s real-world 
identity and through interactions with one’s real-world friends, acquaintances, family, and 
work colleagues. Often this information is exposed to a range of unexpected audiences 
resulting in unintended consequences. It is additionally stored on Facebook servers for an 
indefinite amount of time and for often uncertain purposes. The state of personal information 
profusion and the opportunities to exploit it by individuals and Facebook itself have occurred 
swiftly with the fast, and at times volatile, development of Facebook over the last nine years. 
It has left us in a state of bewilderment and uncertainty, especially when it comes to the 
issues of privacy violations. This research paper aims to address the complex and 
controversial debate around privacy invasions, specifically with regard to Facebook. It will 
do so by developing a rigorous conception of privacy. It will apply this conception to 
Facebook by analysing its development as well as its current state of features and privacy 
policy to determine exactly what privacy violations occur; how and why they occur; and the 
extent to which Facebook is accountable for such violations. It will then also employ the 
conception of privacy to critically assess the effectiveness of a recent social network called 
Diaspora*, which was started as a reaction to the privacy violations occurring on Facebook, 
and is claimed to be a superior, privacy-preserving social network. 
As will soon be elucidated, since its inception, Facebook has been in a continual state 
of flux, with changes to its features and privacy policy occurring regularly. For this reason, 
the time frame of the analysis was limited to Facebook’s beginning in 2004 to June 2012. The 
closing date was chosen because it was a month after Facebook shares became available to 
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the public, which marked a significant milestone in its continual development, and 
additionally was the date the Facebook privacy policy had last been modified
1
. 
1.2. Towards a Conception of Social Network Privacy 
In order to critically assess accusations of privacy violations directed at Facebook it is 
necessary to engage with a conception of privacy. The conception developed in this paper 
will be primarily based on the framework of Helen Nissenbaum, a professor of media culture 
and communication, as established in her book Privacy in Context
2
, as well as supporting 
theories found in most of the literature reviewed. Arriving at a concise, universally applicable 
definition is, as Nissenbaum warns, a complex endeavour (2). Robert Post, a Yale law 
professor states “privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory 
dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair 
whether it can be usefully addressed at all” (2087). However, this does not mean it is a task to 
be abandoned completely, as the conception established in this chapter will be framed within 
(and thus limited to) the context of online social networks, and will be separated into two 
somewhat distinct dimensions – the context of social interactions between social network 
users, and the context of interactions between social network owners and their users. It has 
been stated that “agreement on a broad analytical definition of privacy in the abstract is 
difficult if not impossible. But discussions of the privacy implications of specific events and 
practices are easier to understand and discuss” (Waldo, Lin, and Millett 85). Furthermore, 
what will be produced in this chapter is not so much a precise definition as it is a distinct 
understanding of the requirements necessary to preserve privacy in the contexts just 
described. These conceptions will be applied to the next two chapters where the privacy 
policies and practices of two digital social networks, Facebook and Diaspora*, will be 
assessed and compared.  
                                                          
1
 As will be revealed in Chapter Four, Facebook subsequently revised their privacy policy in November 2012 
2
 Privacy in Context was not only cited in Solove’s book, but has been cited by many (over 400 on Google 
Scholar) scholarly articles and journals on the subject of information technology and privacy. 
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Before one can formulate a notion of privacy, it is necessary to examine how it has 
been commonly conceived, and how this conception has limited and confused evaluations of 
the legitimacy of various privacy violations. Therefore, this chapter first sets out to explain 
what privacy does not entail – it addresses previous or traditional notions of privacy that are 
insufficient in dealing with the complexities and nuances of privacy issues both in general 
and within the context of today’s Information Age. The next section dispels commonly 
argued reasons for not needing privacy, which have often been raised with regard to 
Facebook practices, and which have thwarted a meaningful analysis of potential violations. 
Once this foundation has been established, the impacts of privacy loss are described. These 
impacts are explained in terms of potential consequences as established by many scholars in 
relation to a general notion of privacy (in contexts greater than online social networks). 
Additionally, examples of actual consequences experienced by social network users are 
provided. Finally, the conceptions of social network privacy are elucidated.  
As alluded to earlier, it is now necessary to point out the two distinct dimensions of 
Facebook issues that will be dealt with in this paper. The first dimension is related to the 
harvesting and commercial exploitation of user data by Facebook itself (i.e. its data practices) 
and the second is associated with violations that result from users disclosing their own 
information on social networks, as well as others disclosing information about a particular 
user. Kate Raynes-Goldie terms these two dimensions of privacy “institutional privacy” and 
“social privacy” respectively (Raynes-Goldie). Throughout the rest of this paper these two 
terms will be used in this way. 
1.3. What Privacy is Not 
1.3.1. Public vs. Private 
A common conception of privacy (both in legal and philosophical terms) assumes that 
everything is divided into two separate realms – a public one and a private one. The private 
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realm is usually confined to “the familial, the personal, or intimate relations”, while the 
public realm “signals civic action...beyond the home and the personal” (Nissenbaum 90). In 
this binary view of privacy any information that is placed in public view has no claim to 
privacy protection (Solove 163). This conception is dealt with in most of the literature. Helen 
Nissenbaum, in Privacy in Context uses the term “public/private dichotomy” (89–102), while 
Daniel J. Solove refers to it as the “secrecy paradigm” (The Digital Person 43). Despite the 
common conception, we often in fact expect and require privacy when in public. This 
expectation is often illustrated by the example of our expectations when having a 
conversation in a restaurant. In this context, even though we are in a public location and our 
conversation may be audible to those around us, we still expect others not to listen in (Solove, 
The Future 166). As Danah Boyd and Alice Marwick stress - “Engaging in public life does 
not entail throwing privacy out the window” (25). Additionally, Solove states that most of our 
personal information exists in records that are outside of our “secret” realm and it is almost 
impossible to “live life as an Information Age ghost, leaving no trail or residue” (The Digital 
Person 8). To participate in society today, both in the online and the offline world (e.g. 
banking both online and offline, shopping with credit cards, voting), it is inevitable that we 
generate personal information, and that this information is stored in external databases 
beyond our own “private” physical or virtual repositories. 
The legitimacy of requiring privacy specifically within private realms was 
acknowledged in 1890 in a highly influential article that appeared in the Harvard Law Review 
by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. The article entitled “The Right to Privacy” has been 
credited as fundamental in the establishment of a “comprehensive legal right to privacy” 
(Nissenbaum 1). It was written in response to the newly invented instantaneous camera and 
the increasingly invasive nature of the press. In this paper Warren and Brandeis assert that 
“instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of 
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private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the 
prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’” 
(195 -196). Because one’s images could be captured without one’s consent and from far 
away, Brandeis and Warren acknowledged that one should be able to sue for non-consensual 
photography (Solove, The Future 190). Although Warren and Brandeis focused on the 
“precincts of private and domestic life”, they insightfully acknowledged the danger of the 
abilities of technologies (in their case photography and the press) to disrupt and blur the 
distinctions of public and private realms. Whether a photograph is taken in private or in 
public, “there is a difference between what is captured in the fading memories of only a few 
people and what is broadcast to a worldwide audience” (Solove, The Future 163). Solove is 
asserting here that the persistence and publication capacities technologies allow can 
drastically change the nature of what occurs in public, and so, more than ever, people should 
be provided with protection outside of the traditionally private realm. Furthermore, as 
Nissenbaum stresses, what we could once expect in the public realm has been drastically 
changed by these (photographic and press) technologies: “In the period before such 
technologies were common, people could count on going unnoticed and unknown in public 
arenas; they could count on disinterest in the myriad scattered details about them” (117). 
With the further advancement of modern technology (e.g. mobile phone cameras, 
closed circuit television cameras) the public privacy requirement is even more significant. As 
Solove states: “Today data is gathered about us at every turn. Surveillance cameras are 
sprouting up everywhere. There are twenty-four-hour surveillance cameras in public linked to 
websites for anybody to view” (Solove, The Future 163). Additionally, since the emergence 
of the World Wide Web and most recently social networks, more of our daily activities are 
conducted online. The nature of the online realm (allowing even greater persistence and 
publication than photography and the press) introduces even more challenges to our 
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understanding of and expectations for the notion of “public” and the consequences of 
activities within it. This will be discussed in depth in the next chapter. 
1.3.2. Big Brother and Invasion Conceptions 
Another common conception of privacy issues that has been raised more recently in 
relation to online social networks (and online technology in general) is what Solove terms the 
“Big Brother Metaphor”. George Orwell’s famous novel 1984 is often referred to when 
talking about privacy invasions and surveillance issues. However, Solove feels that this 
metaphor focuses too much on the concept of surveillance by a centralized malevolent entity. 
This concept does not sufficiently tackle the kind of surveillance that occurs between 
Facebook and its users when collecting their generally innocuous information (The Digital 
Person 35). It additionally does not deal with the kind of peer-to-peer surveillance occurring 
on Facebook. As the next section will reveal, surveillance may indeed be an issue in both 
social and institutional contexts but focusing on this issue alone limits the assessment of other 
significant violations that may occur.  
Solove also debunks what he terms the “Invasion Conception”. This notion assumes 
that a violation occurs only when a person is directly injured by the perpetrator’s invasion 
(The Digital Person 8). The problem with this conception is that digital dossiers
3
 and many 
information revelations in the social context do not commonly invade privacy in a direct or 
explicit manner. Often our information is aggregated at different stages and connected across 
databases for different, mostly harmless purposes, which would not be a valid violation in 
terms of this invasion conception (Solove, The Digital Person 8). Solove also goes on to 
discuss what he terms the “aggregation effect” which he explains as “information breeds 
information” (The Digital Person 44). Individual pieces of information may seem harmless 
                                                          
3
 A dossier is a “collection of detailed data about an individual” (Solove, The Digital Person 1). Solove explains 
that today there are “hundreds of companies that are constructing gigantic (digital) databases of psychological 
profiles, amassing data about an individual’s race, gender, income, hobbies, and purchases” ( The Digital 
Person 2) 
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but, when combined and interpolated, can amount to meaningful insights about a person. 
Furthermore, in Privacy Lost, David Holtzman stresses that “web searching and blogging are 
impulsive, and although each instance may not be revealing, collectively searches and blog 
entries paint a detailed picture of a person’s opinions and interests” (12). The analysis of 
Facebook’s privacy policy in the next chapter will reveal the extent of the information that 
Facebook acquires from most users, and that may as a result be available to other individuals. 
The section that follows shortly in this chapter will reveal the problems that may arise as a 
result of this “aggregation effect”. 
1.4. Dispelling Reasons for Not Needing Privacy 
1.4.1 Nothing to Hide 
Often as a result of the simplistic or inaccurate notions of privacy (discussed in the 
previous section), it is argued that we in fact do not need privacy at all. One of these 
arguments is what Solove terms “Nothing to Hide”(“‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’” 748), which 
assumes that people only require privacy if they are doing something illicit or illegal (Boyd 
and Marwick 17). Nissenbaum echoes this observation when she explains that often it is 
argued that privacy “is more likely a cover for the freedom to do wrong” (Nissenbaum 76). In 
fact, Eric Schmidt, CEO of Google, made this exact argument in response to concerns over 
Google’s data tracking practises, stating that, “if you have something that you don't want 
anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place” (Mick). However, Solove 
states that the basis of this argument incorrectly assumes that privacy is solely about 
concealing wrongs (“‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’” 764). As this chapter will show, 
specifically in the next section (“Consequences of Diminished Privacy”), the preservation of 
privacy serves many other significant values above the ability to perform illicit activities 
without getting caught. 
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1.4.2. Lack of Privacy Concerns 
Another opinion voiced frequently is that people no longer care about privacy and 
therefore do not need it. Supposedly Facebook users have succumbed to exhibitionist 
behaviour and have discarded all concerns over their privacy in the process (Peterson 3). In 
2010 Mark Zuckerberg, founder of Facebook, expressed his belief that the desire for privacy 
as a social norm is disappearing. Zuckerberg stated that “people have really gotten 
comfortable not only sharing more information and different kinds, but more openly and with 
more people. That social norm is just something that has evolved over time” (qtd. in 
Johnson).  
The economics columnist for the Washington Post, Robert J. Samuelson believes that 
the Internet and social networks specifically have introduced what he calls “mass 
exhibitionism” and that their popularity “contradicts the belief that people fear the Internet 
will violate their right to privacy”. Samuelson asserts that people’s obsession with fame and 
“spilling their guts” as shown in crass reality television shows like “Jerry Springer”, has been 
facilitated en masse by social networks and that “millions of Americans are gleefully 
discarding -- or at least cheerfully compromising -- their right to privacy. They're posting 
personal and intimate stuff in places where thousands or millions can see it” (Samuelson).  
Anita Allen, an American privacy law expert, also asserts in her paper “Coercing 
Privacy” that from as early as 1999 people no longer care for privacy. She states that “one 
detects signs of an erosion of the taste for and expectation of privacy” (728). Allen suggests 
that such “erosion of privacy” could be due to technologies that make it easier for individuals 
to disclose and publicise information and for institutions to track and commercialise such 
disclosures (730). Like Samuelson, she also attributes exhibitionist tendencies to explain the 
privacy erosion, again asserting that the Web has facilitated and encouraged such tendencies 
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(731). Allen uses Jennicam
4
, a website that existed from 1996 to 2003 and created by Jennifer 
Ringley to publicise every part of her life via a webcam, as an extreme example of the 
increase in exhibitionism. She additionally asserts that the popularity of the site - the large 
numbers of people wanting to “consume other people’s privacy” - is an indication of the lack 
of concern for privacy (730). 
In addition, many scholars have also argued that although many may claim to be 
concerned about privacy, their behaviour reflects something different. This apparent 
contradiction is known as the “privacy paradox” (Raynes-Goldie, “Digitally Mediated 
Surveillance” 4). The term was adopted to explain the apparent contradiction between 
surveys in which people indicated a strong concern for privacy, and studies that observed the 
behaviour of people carelessly disregarding privacy. In 2006, a study of 294 Facebook users 
and non-users at an American university indicated this dichotomy between reported attitudes 
and actual behaviour (Acquisti and Gross 11). The study found that on average users ranked 
the subject of “Privacy Policy” as very important in the “public debate” (more important than 
terrorism) (8). 81% of participants showed a significant degree of concern about the 
possibility of a stranger knowing where they lived, their location and their class schedule and 
46% showed the highest degree of concern. The study then revealed that 89.74% of 
undergraduate users who conveyed the highest degrees of concern about the privacy risk 
cases presented were still joining Facebook (8). The study also showed, for example that 
more than 48% of users who showed the highest level of concern over strangers finding out 
their sexual orientation, had in fact made that piece of information open to the public on their 
Facebook profiles (11). It was also shown, however, that 30% of participants were unaware 
that Facebook in fact provided tools to limit the visibility and searchability of profiles (16). 
77% of participants had not read Facebook’s privacy policy and between 56% and 70% were 
                                                          
4
 Archive of Jennicam website: http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.jennicam.org 
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completely ignorant of various aspects of Facebook’s data collection practices5 (18). Lastly, 
33% of the students believed that it was “either impossible or quite difficult” for people not 
associated with the university to access the university’s Facebook network6 (11). It was, 
however, in fact the case that the default settings on Facebook at the time where such that 
anyone on the Facebook network could search user profiles and anyone in the same 
geographical location or university could view a user’s profile (2). 
In dispute of the first claim (of Zuckerberg, Samuelson and Allen) raised here that 
privacy norms on social networks have changed drastically, this paper asserts that it is to 
many degrees a misjudgement. As Nissenbaum, Boyd, and Peterson all stress, the majority of 
a user’s friends on a particular social network are his/her real-world friends as well. A study 
from 2008 revealed that only 0.4% of friendships on Facebook were merely online 
relationships (Mayer and Puller 332). Therefore most users’ expectations for privacy on 
social networks are infused with their social interactions and privacy expectations of the 
offline world, and “the overwhelming majority of Facebook relationships are digital 
representations of their corporeal counterparts, and as such are animated by the social roles, 
expectations, and norms from the ‘real world’” (Peterson 9). Additionally, as the 2006 Gross 
and Acquisti study showed, many Facebook users stated concerns for various privacy issues 
on Facebook, whether or not this was reflected in their behaviours is somewhat irrelevant 
with regard to the “exhibitionist” claim – exhibitionists generally do not have, or pretend to 
have, concerns for privacy. There may be no denying a rise in interest in some people 
disclosing their intimate details to millions on TV and online, and many consuming such 
revelations, but to claim that every Facebook user is motivated by the same desires and 
therefore does not want any form of privacy is far too simplistic a view. 
                                                          
5
 67 % “believe that FB does not collect information about them from other sources regardless of their use of the 
site”; 70 % “that Facebook does not combine information about them collected from other sources”; 56% “that 
FB does not share personal information with third parties” 
6
 At the time of this study Facebook was only open to university and high school students in America. 
11 
 
In addition, in dispute of the privacy paradox claim, concluding that the contradictory 
behaviour shown in the Gross and Acquisti study implies that users do not care about privacy 
at all, fails to recognise other significant factors that may have affected such behaviour. The 
high rates of ignorance regarding Facebook privacy controls as well as Facebook data 
practices, and the delusion of the isolated visibility of each network may have had a 
significant impact on the carelessness of the disclosures observed. A study at Carnegie 
Mellon University in 2007 aimed to determine if people (more general consumers on 
websites) would “incorporate privacy considerations into their online purchasing decisions” if 
privacy policies were made more accessible and clear. The experiment conducted consisted 
of providing subjects with a shopping search engine that annotated search results with a 
privacy rating and a concise summary of the particular retailer’s privacy policy (Tsai et al. i). 
The results of the experiment indicated that with the annotated concise privacy information, 
subjects opted to purchase from retailers that had higher privacy protection and additionally, 
were willing to pay a premium for such purchases ( 21).  
Furthermore, as Raynes-Goldie suggests, since the “privacy paradox” term was 
conceived in 2006, the social network “landscape” may have changed quite drastically 
(“Digitally Mediated Surveillance” 2). With regard to Facebook specifically, the extent of 
change will be revealed in the next chapter as the development of Facebook is traced. This 
chapter will specifically reveal the increased indignation of users and privacy advocates as 
each new change was implemented by Facebook. It is possible that this state of change may 
be reflected in privacy behaviours too. A study published in February 2012 comparing data 
between 2009 and 2011, shows that although social network users initially may have been 
careless with their privacy, since 2009 an increase from 56% to 63% of users have removed 
contacts; 36% to 44% have removed comments
7
 from their profile; and 30% to 37% have 
                                                          
7
 See glossary 
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deleted their names from photographs in which they had been tagged
8
 (Madden 2). The study 
also indicates that 58% of users have their profiles restricted to completely private and 19% 
to partially private (visible to friends-of-friends
9
), although it does not indicate the 
percentages in 2009. The primary implication of this study is that users are actively taking 
steps to manage and control their privacy on social networks, indicating that not only do users 
in fact care about privacy; they also behave in a manner that is consistent with such concerns. 
Nissenbaum additionally asserts that Facebook users do in fact reflect their desires for 
privacy in their behaviour but not necessarily in relation to the narrow conception of privacy 
that implies users only require secrecy (151). The privacy paradox has frequently been 
levelled against the online behaviour of teenagers but as Boyd and Marwick stress in a very 
recent study of teenage attitudes and behaviour: “All teens have a sense of privacy, although 
their definitions of privacy vary widely. Their practices in networked publics are shaped by 
their interpretation of the social situation, their attitudes towards privacy and publicity, and 
their ability to navigate the technological and social environment” (1). Reinforcing the earlier 
argument that privacy goes beyond the need for privacy only in non-public realms, Boyd and 
Marwick’s study shows that in fact “this is not a contradictory stance; it parallels how people 
have always engaged in public spaces” (25). 
1.4.3. Privacy vs. Free Speech 
Many advocates who argue against regulations to protect privacy have claimed that 
privacy regulation conflicts with other more important values and thus should be discarded 
completely. Of the values that conflict, one of the most significant and common that is 
asserted is freedom of speech. It is important at this point to keep in mind the social network 
privacy contexts established earlier, and the fact that various dimensions of privacy issues are 
often quite distinct. It is most often the case that social privacy, and specifically others 
                                                          
8
 See glossary 
9
 See glossary 
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disclosing information about a particular user on a social network, conflicts with free speech. 
One such advocate that is wary of strict regulations of this kind of privacy issue is American 
First Amendment scholar, Eugene Volokh, who states that “the difficulty is that the right to 
information privacy - my right to control your communication of personally identifiable 
information about me - is a right to have the government stop you from speaking about me” 
(2). According to Volokh, the case of the government restricting such disclosures would be a 
violation of the First Amendment. However, as Solove asserts there have been many cases in 
America where the Supreme Court acknowledged that freedom of expression needs to be 
balanced by the law of defamation (The Future 126). This is the case in South Africa as well, 
where freedom of expression is guaranteed in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, but where it is not an absolute trumping of all other laws, including defamation law 
(Victoria 4). The problem arises in the case of social network users disclosing truthful 
information about a user, as defamation law is limited to revealing false facts about another 
person (Solove, The Future 126). However, Solove asserts that because the Supreme Court 
acknowledges that not all forms of speech need protection, “speech of private concern” 
should not be as strictly protected as speech that is legitimately of concern to the public (128 
-129). For the majority of disclosures on social networks, the public would not be served in 
any way by knowing the information revealed, and as such, the law should protect these 
disclosures.  
Furthermore, both Solove and Nissenbaum stress the importance of assessing the key 
purposes of free speech in the first place. This reveals how privacy serves the same ends as 
those of free speech (Solove, The Future 129). For example a fundamental reason for needing 
free speech is to ensure “individual autonomy” (130), but as the next section will reveal, 
privacy also promotes autonomy in that “the disclosure of personal information can severely 
inhibit a person’s autonomy and self-development” and “risk of disclosure can inhibit people 
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from engaging in taboo activities” (130). Free speech also serves to promote democracy. 
However, political debates are only enriched by speech relevant to public interests, and not 
by speech of private concern – “reporting people’s secrets rarely contributes much to 
politics”, re-enforcing the need to distinguish between different types, and thus values, of 
speech. Furthermore, Nissenbaum stresses the need to “take into consideration not only the 
potential chilling of speech due to privacy, but the chilling of speech due to reductions in 
privacy” (111). This is especially relevant to the case of social privacy and self-revelation, 
where one’s disclosure may be protected by freedom of expression laws and by the safety of 
its privacy. 
1.5. Consequences of Diminished Privacy 
1.5.1. Surveillance 
In order to grasp a more comprehensive conception of privacy it is necessary to 
understand the purposes and values it serves, as well as the impact of diminished privacy. 
One of the most common concerns is that without privacy the potential for surveillance 
increases. Surveillance on social networks may occur in the social context, where a user’s 
friends can observe his/her profile and his/her activities, and where a disclosure intended for 
the social context may be later observed by external parties who may in fact be institutions 
(for example law enforcement, potential employers, government) or other individuals. 
Surveillance may also occur in the institutional context, where the social network owner, in 
possession of all the data accumulated from its users’ activities, can scrutinise such data. 
Nissenbaum asserts that freedom from scrutiny, enables “artistic expression and 
intellectual development” to prosper and the formation of autonomous moral and political 
beliefs. Freedom from scrutiny implies that one is not burdened by the fear of 
“disapprobation, censure, and ridicule”, or the pressure to subscribe to conventions (75). 
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In a similar vein, Jeffrey Reiman introduces the idea of an “informational fishbowl” 
where the people contained within are observable from one location (28). Reiman identifies 
four kinds of risks resulting from this situation: 
1. Extrinsic loss of freedom - People may change or stop any unconventional activities 
out of concern for possible derision or limitation of future prospects like employment. 
2. Intrinsic loss of freedom - People may start to perceive themselves and their 
behaviour through the eyes of those watching due to the above-described self-
censorship. 
3. Symbolic Risk -This involves the limitation of autonomous expression. 
4. Psycho - political metamorphosis - In addition to the behaviour limiting effects, a 
restriction of how individuals think may be caused, resulting in stunted ambition and 
development (35–42). 
The surveillance described here may be relevant to losses of both social and 
institutional privacy. However, the aspect of being observable from one location is 
specifically relevant to the centralised nature of Facebook, and thus to institutional privacy. 
In The Facebook Effect, David Kirkpatrick raises this issue in relation to social privacy more 
appropriately by stating that “Others ask how it might affect an individual's ability to grow 
and change if their actions and even their thoughts are constantly scrutinized by their friends” 
(16). 
1.5.2. Reputation 
In addition to the thwarting of autonomy that may arise from the awareness of being 
under surveillance, the results of surveillance itself may have severe consequences for one’s 
reputation. The amount of information generated in social network activity per user is vast 
(the extent of which will be shown in the next chapter) and as such can provide quite an 
extensive view of a person. Even if a particular user chooses not to disclose a substantial 
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amount of information, as a result of the “aggregation effect” mentioned earlier, information 
can be inferred about a user, through the summation of small amounts of data and with the 
implicit information of a user’s friend network. Grimmelmann reports on a study where 
researchers could deduce the age and nationality of a user of a social network based on the 
details of the user’s friends (1173). 
 Solove warns that reputation damage becomes problematic when information that 
was intended for one context is placed in another context, as an individual may be misjudged 
due to having “only partial knowledge of someone else’s situation” (The Future 66). 
Information about a person gleaned through aggregation or inference or taken out of context 
may portray an individual in an inaccurate or “distorted” manner (Solove, The Digital Person 
45). Nissenbaum points out that if this incorrect or imprecise information is used further 
down the line in situations such as employment or credit ratings, the effects can be dire for 
the individual concerned. Specific examples of such consequences will be revealed shortly. 
Furthermore, Solove points out the importance of being allowed a second chance. 
With the permanence of online information, all our past indiscretions and mistakes do not 
allow a recovery from possible youthful immaturity (The Future 72). “Still another effect of 
new information technologies is the erosion of privacy protection once provided through 
obscurity or the passage of time; e.g., youthful indiscretions can now become impossible to 
outlive as an adult” (Waldo, Lin, and Millett 31). 
1.5.3. Identity Theft 
Reputational and potentially severe financial harm may also occur through fraudulent 
indiscretions, in the form of identity theft - “the fraudulent construction of identities” 
(Nissenbaum 78). Identity theft may arise in both the social context where personal 
information can be gleaned and exploited by individuals obtaining publicly available 
information through the social network interface, but it is possible for it to occur as a result of 
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social network data safety negligence, where databases containing private
10
 data may be 
hacked. In this case, as will be discussed further in the next section, when establishing 
requirements for institutional privacy, the social network owner should be held accountable 
for data safety. Thus identity theft is a relevant consequence of diminished institutional 
privacy. In the case of Facebook, the risk of information exposure may be especially high as 
millions
11
 of users’ data are stored on the centralised Facebook servers. In South Africa in 
2011 it was reported that there were 20 cases of financially related identity theft per day 
(Zungo). With access to large amounts of personal data on Facebook, identity theft may in 
fact become particularly problematic in South Africa.  
1.5.4. Case Studies 
These consequences are not just speculative hypotheses; they are in fact evident in 
situations that have occurred frequently throughout Facebook’s history and across the globe. 
In 2006, in Illinois, a police officer tried to catch two students who he had found urinating in 
public. One of the students (Marc Chiles) managed to escape, while the other (Adam Gartner) 
was apprehended. Gartner claimed that he did not know Chiles but the police officer 
proceeded to search the university Facebook profiles until he found Gartner. By looking at 
Gartner’s list of Facebook friends, the police officer was able to infer whom Chiles was and 
that he was in fact Gartner’s friend. Gartner was subsequently charged with obstruction of 
justice (Peterson 10). This case shows how easy it is to extrapolate information about an 
individual through a social network, without that person disclosing huge amounts of 
particularly harmful or illicit information, and how information used for a completely 
different purpose can have severe consequences on that person’s fate further down the line. 
However, there are indeed many cases of Facebook users posting potentially harmful 
information, which they had intended to remain within the context of their Facebook friends, 
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and which had been subsequently used against them. In February 2012, in Johannesburg, a 
senior inspector at the South African Civil Aviation Authority was suspended for a negative 
Facebook post about his seniors, allegedly after one of the inspector’s colleagues informed 
his seniors of the comment (Gibson). In 2011, in America, it was reported that “confusion 
about what American workers can or can't post has led to a surge of more than 100 
complaints at the National Labour Relations Board - most within the past year - and created 
uncertainty for businesses about how far their social media policies can go” (“Employers 
Negotiate”). In Chicago, a car salesman was fired after posting complaints about the 
conditions of his work, however the National Labour Relations Board found that the 
salesman had a legal claim for his post to remain protected as he was “expressing concerns 
about the terms and conditions of his job, frustrations he had earlier shared in person with 
other employees” (“Employers Negotiate”).  
A more severe case of the unintended consequences of self-disclosure on Facebook is 
that of Shaheen Dhada, a 21 year old Indian woman, who posted a comment questioning 
Mumbai’s shutdown during a politician, Bal Thackeray’s funeral (Mccarthy). Dhada intended 
the post for her Facebook friends but it is presumed that someone saw the post and then 
informed Shiv Sena, Thackeray’s hard-line political party (Narayan). A local Shiv Sena 
leader, Bhushan Sankhe, immediately lodged a complaint with the police, and just 25 minutes 
after the post, Sankhe phoned Dhada asking her if she believed it was right to have posted 
such a comment (Narayan), (Bhatt). Dhada immediately deleted her comment and 
apologised, but by then a mob had already started vandalising her uncle’s clinic (Narayan). 
Within minutes the police arrived at Dhada’s door to place her under arrest, and had in fact 
also arrested a friend of Dhada, who had liked
12
 Dhada’s post on Facebook. The police 
arrested the two for “insulting religious sentiments, and booked them under a little-known 
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provision of India’s Information Technology Act, known as 66A” (Narayan). The act 
prohibits online content that is “grossly offensive or has menacing character” or incites 
“annoyance, inconvenience, hatred, danger, obstruction, insult” (Narayan). Dhada and her 
friend were released on bail and due to subsequent public outcry, the charges were eventually 
dropped, but Dhada had become so fearful of any further harm that she deleted her Facebook 
account.  
This story has many significant dimensions that reinforce issues raised in this chapter. 
Most relevant to this section is the impact on Dhada’s reputation (almost obtaining a criminal 
record) and her physical safety (the violence of the mob). This incident also shows the severe 
harm of surveillance to individual autonomy, as after the incident Dhada deleted her 
Facebook account, in fear of expressing her opinions again. She did subsequently open a 
Facebook account again but reported that she is now very careful about what she posts (Nair); 
an evident response of self-censorship. Furthermore, this story is a significant example of 
how free speech and privacy support the same values. If Dhada’s post had remained 
contained among her Facebook friends or if her freedom to express her own opinion had been 
respected, Dhada would not have suffered such harsh consequences. It is also important to 
note that the context in which this incident took place, in what is clearly an extreme political 
landscape, is largely the reason for such a severe outcome. As the next chapter will reveal, a 
fundamental issue with Facebook is its rapid progression from a contained college network in 
an established democratic country, to a world-wide phenomenon encompassing a boundless 
number of contexts. 
As indicated, damage to a user’s reputation often occurs as a result of other people on 
social networks disclosing information about that user. The Daily Mail in 2007 pulled 
photographs off a Facebook group
13
 called “30 Reasons Girls Should Call It a Night”, and 
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published them in the newspaper. The photographs showed a number of drunken college 
women in very compromising positions and the article named every girl in the photographs. 
One of the photographs was of a student who had not posted it herself. The student was 
subsequently inundated with phone calls
14
 from companies offering to pay her for interviews 
of a sexual nature, and to this day a search on Google of the student’s name returns the Daily 
Mail article (Peterson 11). With the permanence, easy publication, and searchability that the 
Internet allows, this case shows the danger of not having control of disclosures made by 
others on social networks. 
A case of identity theft via Facebook in the social context that resulted in reputational 
harm, occurred in Belgium in 2011. A woman was found guilty by a court in Ghent after she 
created a fake Facebook profile impersonating her ex-employer and conducting activities 
under the profile that implied he was committing adultery (Tigner). Although the extent of 
reputational harm in this case was not particularly severe, it is not difficult to imagine the 
further extremes that this kind of theft can achieve. Facebook tries to ensure that all profiles 
correspond to real identities (as will be covered further in the next chapter), however there are 
still instances that go unnoticed. Furthermore, cases of gleaning user details from Facebook 
and then employing such details in other contexts (for example loan applications) are also 
possible. 
The risk of identity theft in the institutional context may be high too. In 2009, a 
website called FBHive discovered a security flaw that allowed it to access restricted user data 
on Facebook: “with a simple hack, everything listed in a person’s “Basic Information” 
section can be viewed, no matter what their privacy settings are. This information includes 
networks, sex, birthday, hometown, siblings, parents, relationship status, interested in, 
looking for, political views and religious views” (“Private Facebook Info”).  
                                                          
14
 It is assumed that the girl’s phone number was obtained from her Facebook profile, after her name was 
revealed in the article (Peterson). 
21 
 
These cases indicate the harm that can result from diminished privacy on social 
networks, and the resulting limitations on critical aspects of one’s life such as employment, 
autonomy and safety. With the application of the conceptions established in the following 
section, the exact reasons why these kinds of violations occur and how the Facebook 
environment itself facilitates such violations will be explained in the next chapter.  
1.6. A Conception of Social and Institutional Privacy 
Helen Nissenbaum’s proposed framework of “contextual integrity” will form the basis 
of the conceptions of institutional and social privacy used in this study. The primary 
foundation of contextual integrity is that “a right to privacy is... a right to appropriate flow 
of information” (129). The appropriateness of information flow is dependent on the particular 
context concerned, as individuals exist in a variety of specific social contexts in which they 
act in distinct roles (129). Privacy is therefore governed by norms of appropriateness and 
norms of distribution. “Appropriateness” determines the kind of information for a particular 
situation and “distribution/transmission” determines the way in which, and with whom 
information may be disclosed. In other words this means that “a judgment that a given action 
or practice violates privacy is a function of the context in which the activity takes place, what 
type of information is in question, and the social roles of the people involved” (Waldo, Lin, 
and Millett 63). 
In the health care context doctors are obligated to keep their patient’s information 
confidential. If, for example, a patient’s information is disclosed to a commercial corporation, 
the social norm of distribution has been breached. In a friendship context, information 
transmission (sharing) occurs voluntarily and reciprocally, but again norms of distribution 
may be violated if information shared between two friends, is revealed to a parent. Norms of 
appropriateness may be breached when activities appropriate to a social party or a bar take 
place in a work environment. 
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Nissenbaum asserts that these informational flows are also governed by the values of 
the particular context, i.e. the primary purpose of the context. When assessing the norms of 
appropriateness and distribution of novel situations introduced by new technologies, one 
needs to refer to the norms of existing contexts that are similar or are intended to achieve the 
same purposes. In addition, one needs to take into account whether the new technology 
practices in fact further the specific goals and values of the context. 
1.6.1. Social Privacy 
It has been shown earlier in this chapter that social networks are primarily an 
extension of real-world relationships, so Nissenbaum asserts that similar to the context of 
telephone communication, they should be considered as a context whose primary value is to 
facilitate information sharing, communication and connecting. Additionally, the telephone 
system does not exist as one distinct context, but in fact is a “medium for interactions 
occurring within diverse distinctive contexts, such as family, workplace, and medical” (223). 
Therefore, for social privacy to be maintained on social networks, the real-world social 
contexts from which social networks are derived need to be preserved by maintaining their 
norms of appropriateness and distribution. This implies that the social contexts that exist on 
social networks need to be separated appropriately, so that for example a photograph taken 
from the context of a party at a bar with friends does not enter the context of one’s work 
environment (i.e. being visible to one’s work colleagues or bosses), and that disclosures 
intended for one context need to remain within that context. The values of a system that 
facilitates communication and sharing need to be upheld, and that means that people should 
continue to want to disclose their information without fearing the kind of consequences 
described earlier.  
It is useful at this point to revisit issues discussed earlier in this chapter in the light of 
contextual integrity. When addressing the challenge of legitimately requiring privacy in 
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public, Solove asserts that “although we do things in public, we do them in a particular 
context before a particular set of people” (The Future 165). Furthermore, Boyd and Marwick 
acknowledge that privacy involves more than the right to privacy in private (“the right to be 
invisible”), but additionally “who has the right to look, for what purposes, and to what ends” 
(6) – i.e. the contextual roles and values as defined by contextual integrity. Therefore it is 
clear that contextual integrity harmonises with the validity of requiring privacy in public, and 
additionally provides a way to determine the extent of such validity. Additionally, when 
addressing the privacy paradox (of people’s concerns versus their behaviour), Nissenbaum 
emphasises that “there is no paradox in caring deeply about privacy and, at the same time, 
eagerly sharing information as long as the sharing and withholding conform with the 
principled conditions prescribed by governing contextual norms” (187) - again asserting that 
the complexities of privacy cannot be reduced to a strict definition of secrecy. 
1.6.2. Institutional Privacy 
As described earlier, the institutional context on social networks covers the 
relationship between the social network owner (a service provider) and its users (consumers), 
and thus as contextual integrity suggests, one can refer to the context of a consumer/merchant 
relationship as the basis for the requirements needed to uphold institutional privacy. The 
norms of this context generally ensure that within the relationship neither party has an unfair 
advantage over the other; the practices of the merchant in fact serve the primary values of the 
service that the merchant is intending to provide; and that which the consumer is intending to 
utilise; and finally trust is fostered (Nissenbaum 195). The nature of the consumer/merchant 
relationship on Facebook is such that the service provided to users is a medium in which to 
interact and share information, and the payment for such a service is now in the form of 
personal information (which Facebook uses for advertising). Facebook acquires vast 
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quantities of its users' information, and as such the quality of the consumer/merchant 
relationship is significantly dependant on Facebook’s data practices. 
Fortunately, even though social networks are new, the existence of merchants in 
possession of large stores of consumer data is not. Therefore there are common legally 
established standards for fair data practices that govern this relationship. Thus the conception 
of institutional privacy is based on the fair information practices as already established in 
most legal contexts globally. 
 Currently in America, the U.S Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Fair Information 
Practice principles govern the practices of commercial entities and their use of electronic 
information. The five key principles involved are:  
 “Notice/Awareness”- institutions must notify individuals of their collection practices 
before collecting their information.  
 “Choice/Consent”- individuals must be able to choose whether and in what manner, their 
personal data may be used for purposes other than the initial reason for collection. 
 “Access/Participation”- consumers should have access to their information and amend 
any incorrect or incomplete information. 
 “Integrity/Security”- institutions should ensure that the information collected is secure 
and accurate.  
 “Enforcement/Redress”- currently occurs primarily through self regulation as these 
principles are only recommendations and cannot be enforced according to the law. (“Fair 
Information”). 
The South African legal climate with regard to fair information practices is marked by 
the Electronics Communications and Transactions Act, as well as the soon to be promulgated 
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Protection of Personal Information Bill
15
. The Electronics Communications and Transactions 
Act aims primarily to enable electronic communications and transactions, specifically with 
the goal of ensuring wide and easy access for all economic classes (“Marketing: 
Understanding The ECT”). However, the act also focuses on developing a secure 
environment for electronic communications to take place and includes a chapter that outlines 
a non-compulsory set of principles for personal information and privacy protection. This 
section is voluntary but the Protection of Personal Information Bill will soon be enacted 
(“Marketing: Understanding The ECT”). This Bill was designed according to a model very 
similar to that of the European Union (E.U.) (“Protection of Personal Information”). The Bill 
involves eight principles that have been developed in various legislatures around the world 
and that “have become recognised as the leading practice baseline for effective data privacy 
regulation around the world” (Badat). The principles are:  
 “Accountability”- which concerns the responsibility of institutions for compliance with 
the Bill.  
 “Processing Limitation”- which ensures information is processed fairly and lawfully. 
 “Purpose Specification”- which limits the scope of the uses of information allowed by an 
organisation. 
 “Further Processing Limitation”- which limits the use of information to those other than 
initially identified (which need to be defined specifically and explicitly) and for which 
consumers have given consent. 
 “Information Quality”- which ensures institutions preserve the quality of information. 
 “Openness”- which asserts that information processing practises are to be transparent. 
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 “Security Safeguards”- which means institutions are to ensure information is safe from 
“risk of loss, unauthorised access, interference, modification, destruction or disclosure”. 
 “Data Subject Participation”- which ensures individuals should be allowed to correct or 
remove any incorrect or obsolete information (Badat).  
These principles cover the same principles as the FTC’s principles, however the 
explicit requirement for transparency takes the “Notice/Awareness” principle one step further 
in that not only would institutions need to inform consumers of their practices, but they 
would need to do so in a clear and direct manner. Additionally, the limiting of scope of the 
initial and further uses of information also extends the “Access/Consent” principle further. It 
is also significant to note that in terms of contextual integrity this extension directly links to 
the need to preserve the contexts of information. For these reasons and because this Bill is 
based on internationally recognised principles (as mentioned earlier), the conception of 
institutional privacy applied in this paper will consist of these eight principles. 
The next chapter will reveal exactly how Facebook facilitates violations of social 
privacy by collapsing and colliding contexts in a number of ways. It will also reveal which 
dimensions of institutional privacy are violated by Facebook’s current data use policy and 
practices. 
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Chapter Two  
Now that the requirements necessary to maintain both social and institutional privacy 
have been established, an analysis of Facebook’s privacy practices can be undertaken. This 
chapter will begin this analysis by first tracing the development of Facebook over the last 
nine years since its inception in 2004, in order to understand the extent of its change from a 
contained Harvard network to a worldwide network open to anyone. By tracing its 
development, this paper also endeavours to understand the intentions and personal philosophy 
of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg for this social network, particularly in relation to the 
large commercial potential of user data Facebook has amassed over almost a decade. This 
will be followed by an analysis of Facebook’s current privacy policies and controls. Once this 
context (historical and current) has been established, the conceptions of social and 
institutional privacy will be used to explain how and why violations have occurred and are 
currently occurring on Facebook. Furthermore, the extent of Facebook’s accountability for 
such violations will be assessed.  
2.1. Facebook History 
Mark Zuckerberg created Facebook in his Harvard dorm room at the beginning of 
2004 for Harvard students (Kirkpatrick 31). Although it may not have been an articulated, 
fully developed vision at the time, Zuckerberg became famous for saying “I think we can 
make the world a more open place” (qtd. in Kirkpatrick 42). 
2.1.1. Previous Social Networks 
 At the time of Facebook’s inception (originally known as TheFacebook (Kirkpatrick 
27)) two popular social networks already existed - Friendster and MySpace - but these were 
not the first (28). In 1985 America Online started their Internet services that networked 
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people online through chat rooms
16
, message boards
17
 and later (1997) an instant messenger
18
 
service (America Online Instant Messenger - AIM) (64). People would acquire (“quasi-
anonymous”) usernames and interact with one another. The main difference between AIM 
and recent social networks is that users typically used this service to interact with their virtual 
friends only: “Though they maintained email address books inside these services, members 
did not otherwise identify their real-life friends or establish regular communication pathways 
with them” (64). 
Then, in 1997, the sixdegrees.com service was started. This was “the first online 
business that attempted to identify and map a set of real relationships between real people 
using their real names, and it was visionary for its time” (Kirkpatrick 65). On sixdegrees.com 
one created a profile based on one’s real identity (listing one’s name, biographical 
information and interests), and could connect with friends, create groups and search other 
user profiles (Goble). Unfortunately it occurred at a time when server and database hosting 
was very expensive and the average users’ computing power was very limited due to the slow 
dial-up modem speeds (Kirkpatrick 66), and in 2000 sixdegrees.com closed its service (Boyd 
and Ellison 214). 
In 2002 Friendster emerged (Boyd and Ellison 215) and by 2003 it had “several 
million users” (Kirkpatrick 68). It intended to leverage off the fact that it was also a social 
network for real-world friendships, by allowing people to meet others through friends of their 
friends (68). With the emergence of digital cameras and faster Internet, Friendster developed 
the technology to include photographs for each user’s profile page, which were also expected 
to correlate with their real identities. The creators of Friendster were very adamant about this 
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requirement for users to retain their real identities on the site, and began kicking so-called 
“fakesters” (people using fake names and identities) off (Boyd and Ellison 216). Because of 
this harsh reaction, and additionally, because of many technical performance difficulties, 
Friendster began losing users. 
By August 2003, MySpace was launched with the intention of drawing in estranged 
Friendster users (Boyd and Ellison 216). The creator of MySpace, Tom Anderson, 
deliberately allowed users to have pseudonymous identities, and to customize their profile 
pages. This kind of leniency was also evident in the fact that anyone could join MySpace 
without an invitation from an existing user as on Friendster, and later on minors were allowed 
to join too.  
When Zuckerberg launched Facebook in 2004, MySpace had amassed over a million 
users (Kirkpatrick 73). As with both MySpace and Friendster, new Facebook users were 
required to sign up by creating profiles with photos and some biographical information 
(including relationship status, contact numbers, emails and favourite books/movies/music) 
(Kirkpatrick 31-32). However, unlike both previous social networks, Facebook was limited to 
the elite Harvard network only. Similar to the emphasis of real identities on Friendster, 
Facebook users could only sign up with their real names and their Harvard email addresses 
(Boyd and Ellison 218). In addition, users had control over who could view their information 
within the Harvard network (Kirkpatrick 32). In particular contrast to MySpace’s flashy 
profile pages, was the fact that Facebook profile pages were simple and standardised to 
resemble that of the college face book, a pre-existing printed student directory that contained 
photographs and basic information of students at a particular university (Kirkpatrick 23,76). 
2.1.2. University Networks 
By March 2004, Zuckerberg opened up Facebook to Columbia, Stanford and Yale 
(Schneider). One month after its inception it already had 10 000 users (Kirkpatrick 35). The 
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privacy setting was such that students could not see profiles of students at other colleges, but 
after many complaints Zuckerberg realised that opening this up would allow for more growth, 
and so changed this setting. If two users at different colleges both agreed, then they could 
view each other’s profiles (Kirkpatrick 37). 
2.1.3. Advertising 
In September 2004, the wall was added to profiles. This feature enabled users to write 
messages on other users’ profiles. “Suddenly every TheFacebook user had their own public 
bulletin board” (Kirkpatrick 87). In this same month the number of users reached 400 000 
(89). As the number of users and servers needed to house user data increased exponentially, 
so did the maintenance costs. Zuckerberg turned to advertising to finance this (Kirkpatrick 
37). A company that sold advertising for college newspaper websites, Y2M, began to place 
some advertisements on Facebook, and was extremely surprised to see the effective results of 
a MasterCard advertisement for student credit cards: the number of students who had signed 
up for the card in a day exceeded double what they had expected to receive over four months 
(Sutherland 15). However, at the time Zuckerberg wanted to keep advertisements on the site 
as minimal as possible, but understood that some advertising was necessary to cover the site’s 
running costs (Kirkpatrick 42). 
In 2005, the further potential of targeted advertising via Facebook was realised when 
Interscope Records used Facebook to target college cheerleaders in the promotion of a Gwen 
Stefani song that contained a cheerleading chant. Other than using cookies
19
 to track website 
users, this kind of specific targeting (i.e. targeting based on user provided information) had 
been used by very few Internet sites at the time (Kirkpatrick 133). It was also more effective 
than cookie tracking, as cookies collect information per computer, which may be shared by a 
number of users in very different demographic groups, whereas each Facebook profile is 
                                                          
19
 Cookies are small pieces of data created by a website and saved on a user’s computer to store details about the 
particular user the next time the user visits the website (“Cookie Definition”) 
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directly linked to a distinct user. Zuckerberg and his colleagues at Facebook began to realise 
the potential of their vast collection of user data. One of the developers soon assembled a list 
of the valuable user details that could be used for effective targeted advertising and that 
covered a wide range of potential targets: “geography, gender, course, keywords in profile, 
class year, major, relationship status, favourite books, movies or music, political affiliation, 
and university states” (Kirkpatrick 133). Developers also started to write algorithms to tap 
into this information. Unlike MySpace at the time, Facebook could guarantee that all such 
data was validated against real identities. A major breakthrough came in June 2006, when one 
of the largest advertising agencies in the world, Interpublic Group, agreed to invest $10 
million in advertising on Facebook (O’Leary). 
2.1.4. High School Networks 
This critical aspect of ensuring real identities posed a problem for Zuckerberg when 
he decided to open up Facebook to high school students as, without official college email 
addresses, validating users would not be possible. Zuckerberg eventually settled for 
authentication via existing users. In other words, Facebook began to encourage existing 
college users to invite their high school friends to join the network. The new high school 
users could then do the same for the rest of their friends (Kirkpatrick 140). At first, the high 
school and college networks were separate (high school students could not see college 
student profiles and vice versa), but by February 2006 the two were merged.  
The next major development in Facebook’s rapid progress was their photo-hosting 
feature. This feature enabled users to upload photos onto their profiles, on which their friends 
could comment. In addition to this feature, the developers at Facebook added the ability to 
tag users in the photos, which would link to their profiles (Kirkpatrick 144). 85% of users had 
been tagged in a photo a month after this feature was introduced (146). 
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Then in September 2006, another significant feature was launched: the News Feed, a 
page that aggregated and displayed all the activities of a user’s friends. It was introduced 
without any warning to users. Zuckerberg was shocked to see the extremely negative 
response following the launch (Kirkpatrick 172). Almost instantly groups against the News 
Feed emerged, about five hundred in total (Kirkpatrick 178). In one specific group that 
gathered 13 000 members within three hours (“Students against Facebook news feed”), 
someone wrote “You went a bit too far this time, Facebook... very few of us want everyone 
automatically knowing what we update...news feed is just too creepy, too stalker-esque and a 
feature that has to go”(qtd. in Leyden ). In response, Zuckerberg got several of his developers 
to hastily write new privacy controls so that users could choose which of their activities 
would be displayed to their friends (Kirkpatrick 178). In addition, Zuckerberg spent all night 
detailing these new controls in a blog post (179), which started off with an apology and the 
admission: “We really messed this one up” (Zuckerberg).  
This controversy provides great insight into the conflicts between Zuckerberg’s vision 
for transparency and people’s concerns about privacy. Zuckerberg has been known to say 
many times “you have one identity” (Kirkpatrick 186), which he believes should be 
connected to the endeavour for openness, stating that: “the days of you having a different 
image for your work friends or co-workers and for the other people you know are probably 
coming to an end pretty quickly...the level of transparency the world has now won’t support 
having two identities for a person” (qtd in Kirkpatrick 186). Zuckerberg believes that “having 
two identities...is an example of a lack of integrity” (qtd in Kirkpatrick 186). This idea of 
“ultimate transparency” or “radical transparency” seems to proliferate throughout the 
company, with these two terms being adopted by many Facebook employees (Kirkpatrick 
197). In 2012, Zuckerberg affirmed that to “Be Open” is one of the company’s five core 
values, adding that “a more open world is a better world because people with more 
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information can make better decisions and have a greater impact” (“Zuckerberg Reveals 
Facebook’s 5 Values”). Zuckerberg’s zealotry appears to be genuine, as Danah Boyd asserts 
“my encounters with Zuckerberg lead me to believe that he genuinely believes this, he 
genuinely believes that society will be better off if people make themselves transparent” 
(Boyd). Sheryl Sandberg, who became Facebook’s chief operating officer in 2008, also 
affirmed that “Mark really does believe very much in transparency and the vision of an open 
society and open world, and so he wants to push people that way” (qtd. in Kirkpatrick 195). 
However, Sandberg also stated that “I think he also understands that the way to get there is to 
give people granular control and comfort. He hopes you’ll get more open, and he’s kind of 
happy to help you get there. So for him, it’s more of a means to an end.” Sandberg’s opinion 
may explain a lot about why controversies have emerged almost consistently throughout 
Facebook’s development. If Zuckerberg believes that privacy controls offered on Facebook 
are just a temporary option, then it may explain why, despite its many attempts at changing 
privacy policies and features, there still remains significant privacy issues and a significant 
amount of dissatisfaction among privacy advocate groups and some users (which will be 
discussed further shortly).  
2.1.5. Worldwide Open Network 
Zuckerberg’s goal to create an open world came closer to fruition when in late 
September 2006 Facebook was opened up to everyone. Instead of joining a college or school 
network users could now join a regional network (a network associated with their town, city 
or country). Facebook introduced extra privacy controls at the same time including allowing 
users to block others in their network from searching or contacting them. Users could also 
control whether their profile photographs would appear in search results (Arrington). 
In 2007, another significant controversy emerged when Facebook launched Beacon, 
an advertising platform that appeared to be the first active attempt to monetise the purchasing 
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behaviour of its users. With Beacon in place, when a user made a purchase on a particular 
partner website, that purchase activity was published via the News Feed (Grimmelmann 
1147). Beacon was introduced with an opt out in the form of a temporary pop up window that 
would display in the bottom corner of a page after a transaction was made on a particular site 
(1148). If a user closed the pop up window or ignored it, the purchase story would be 
published to the user’s profile (Vielmetti). Many users were shocked to discover that their 
purchases, some of which were embarrassing or intended as a surprise, were revealed to all of 
their friends, and an anti-Beacon group soon had more than 70 000 members (Grimmelmann 
1184). As a result, a class action lawsuit was filed against Facebook. In September 2009 
Beacon was discontinued and in December 2009 the lawsuit was settled (Boyd and Hargittai).  
Perhaps as a result of the failure of Beacon, in March 2008 Sheryl Sandberg, former 
vice president of Global Online Sales and Operations at Google, was hired by Zuckerberg as 
chief operating officer in order to turn Facebook into an “advertising powerhouse” 
(Kirkpatrick 240; Smith). At the time Facebook was only just covering its rapidly growing 
operating costs. Sandberg began running bi-weekly sessions at Facebook on how to monetise 
the large store of user data that it owned (Kirkpatrick 241). “Engagement ads” were a product 
of these sessions. These advertisements would appear to a user in the form of a link to the 
particular business’s Facebook profile with a message encouraging the user to, for example 
like the profile. These advertisements produced about $100 million in revenue in the first 
year, with Facebook charging $5 per thousand views. Since Sandberg joined, advertisers 
using Facebook’s self-service advertisements (advertisements that smaller advertisers buy 
directly from the Facebook site with a credit card) tripled in one year. By 2009, Facebook’s 
overall revenues were more than $550 million, an increase of over $250 million since 2008 
(Kirkpatrick 246). 
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2.1.6. More Features 
In contrast to the controversies of the News Feed and Beacon features, Facebook did 
in fact provide some privacy controls with the introduction of Friends Lists in 2008. This 
control gave users the ability to create various groups and select which friends could be 
added to these. These groups could then be used to limit who had access to certain kinds of 
information (Peterson 30). In December 2009 Facebook overhauled many of its privacy 
controls in order to provide what it claimed to be improved privacy for its users (Bankston). 
These changes intended to simplify privacy controls by removing regional networks, which 
had previously allowed many users to unknowingly expose their profiles to other users in 
their entire city or country. Another change allowed users to select the privacy setting of each 
post (e.g. a status update
20
 or posted photo). Facebook also provided users with a tool to 
guide them through the various privacy controls and settings. However the privacy guide 
recommended settings which encouraged users to allow exposure to “everyone” (completely 
public – to search engines and non Facebook users as well), whereas before the default was 
such that information was exposed to the regional network. Furthermore, Facebook also 
changed certain user details (gender, current city, friends list
21
 and Page likes
22
) to be 
permanently public
23
. Before the change only a user’s name and network were publicly 
available (“EPIC’s Facebook Complaint”). Because of this, the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center filed a complaint with the FTC regarding what they termed “unfair and 
deceptive business practices” (Schwartz). In 2012, this was finally settled. Facebook agreed 
to “give users ‘clear and prominent’ notice when their information is shared; obtain their 
express consent before doing so;… maintain a privacy program; and have privacy audits 
every two years” (Schwartz). 
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 See glossary 
21
 See glossary 
22
 See glossary 
23
 Accessible and searchable to all Facebook users and non-users (see next section on Facebook privacy policy) 
36 
 
Facebook furthered its growth on the Internet in early 2010 by launching its Social 
Plugin
24
 and Graph API
25
 platforms that allowed other websites to integrate with Facebook, 
and which enabled other developers to create applications using Facebook data and actions. 
For example, a user could like a website and this action would then be linked to the user’s 
Facebook profile. In just one week of launching, about 50 000 websites had adopted the 
Social Plugin (Parr). These new changes yet again concerned many, including advocacy 
groups like the Electronic Privacy Information Center who filed a second complaint with the 
FTC stating that the Social Plugins were “misleading and deceptive” because it was not clear 
the extent of access third party developers had to user data (“Social Networking Privacy”). 
Many users declared a “Quit Facebook Day”, and Facebook eventually responded to their 
concerns with an announcement conceding that their privacy settings page was too confusing 
(Boyd and Hargittai). As a result, Facebook launched a new, less complex settings page in 
May 2010. 
In September 2011 Facebook appeared to be taking further steps for improved privacy 
when it launched an enhanced version of its 2008 Friends Lists feature. This original feature 
had only been adopted by 5% of users, according to Zuckerberg (Scott). The improved 
version automatically creates friends lists based on data that Facebook compiles. Automatic 
lists include family, school friends, university friends, and friends living in a user’s city or 
hometown. It also creates a “close friends” list, which a user needs to populate him/herself. 
However, this is facilitated with suggestions based on tracked frequent interactions with 
friends.  
                                                          
24
 A plug-in is an additional piece of “software that is installed into an existing application in order to enhance 
its capability” (“Plug-in Definition from PC Magazine Encyclopedia”)  
25
 API stands for application programming interface and is “a language and message format used by an 
application program to communicate with the operating system or some other control program such as a 
database management system (DBMS) or communications protocol”(“API Definition from PC Magazine 
Encyclopedia”) 
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By 2011 Facebook had amassed 500 million users (Hepburn) and was earning $5.11 
per user in targeted advertising revenue (Weise). Since then, many more features were 
instituted on Facebook (and are covered in the next section in which Facebook’s current 
privacy policy is analysed). In the first three months of 2012, Facebook had a net income of 
$205 billion and a revenue of $1.06 billion, and on 18 May held its Initial Public Offering 
(Ortutay). 
2.2. Current Privacy Policy 
Now that an historical context has been established, a description of Facebook’s 
current 
26
 privacy policy will be provided. Facebook terms this policy its “Data Use Policy”. 
The policy is broken up into subsections and in total is 8 700 words in length.  
2.2.1. Information Facebook Receives 
The first section is titled “Information we receive about you” and details what 
Facebook knows about its users (Couts). Facebook keeps all information a user shares. This 
includes the information required for registration, all information linked to activities on the 
site, and all information a user’s friends share about the user (“Data Use Policy”). 
Additionally, Facebook receives information when a user or non-user interacts with websites 
that use the Social Plugin or Platform (described in detail shortly). Andrew Couts, in his 
article analysing the policy, summarises all the data Facebook receives as follows:  
 Name 
 Age 
 Gender 
 Email address 
 Networks 
 Photos and videos 
 Tags and facial data 
 Profiles you view 
 People you chat with via Facebook Messenger 
 Relationship status 
                                                          
26
 As of June 8 2012 
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 Likes 
 Lists of Interests (movies, music, books, etc) 
 Political association 
 Websites visited  
 Purchases using Facebook Credits 
 Metadata of the above activities (time, date, place of activity) 
 Browser type 
 Operating system type 
 IP address 
 GPS location 
 User ID number 
 Username (“Data Use Policy”) (Couts)  
 
Additionally, Facebook performs aggregation (as explained in the previous chapter, 
combining separate pieces of data for further interpolation) on certain data: “We also put 
together data from the information we already have about you and your friends. For example, 
we may put together data about you to determine which friends we should show you in your 
News Feed or suggest you tag in the photos you post” (“Data Use Policy”).  
It is then indicated that some of the shared information can be made private but some 
will always be public. Public information can be associated with a user outside of Facebook. 
It can be searched via Facebook’s search utility as well as on any search engine. It can also be 
accessed via “Facebook-integrated games, applications, and websites” used by a user and 
his/her friends (“Data Use Policy”). The following information is always public: “name, 
profile pictures, cover photos, gender, username, user ID, comments made on public websites 
that use Facebook’s commenting plug-in, comments made on public websites through 
Facebook’s commenting plug-in about you by other people” (Couts). Additionally, if a friend 
shares information about a user with a public setting, that information will be public.  
One is able to make most of the information sharing on Facebook “private” and to 
vary the degree of privacy to some extent. This means that one can choose to share with all of 
one’s friends, or a certain list of friends. A description of how to employ these controls is 
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provided in the next section (“Sharing and finding you on Facebook”) which will be 
explained shortly. 
Facebook then, very briefly and quite vaguely, explains what it does with user 
information: “We use the information we receive about you in connection with the services 
and features we provide to you and other users like your friends, our partners, the advertisers 
that purchase ads on the site, and the developers that build the games, applications, and 
websites you use” (“Data Use Policy”). It then only provides six examples of how it uses this 
information. In addition, these examples are worded in a manner that seems to advertise 
Facebook and provide justification for the uses rather than objectively listing them. Facebook 
can share user information if a user has given permission, or the user has read this Data Use 
Policy, or any identifiable information has been dissociated from the user.  
The period of data storage is described as “as long as it is necessary to provide 
products and services to you and others”. Additionally, it is stated that “typically” this period 
will be up until an account is deleted. At this point the policy details information regarding 
the deleting and deactivating of an account. A user can either put his/her “account on hold” 
(deactivate it) or terminate his/her account completely (delete it). If an account is deactivated 
then information is not deleted but the user’s timeline is not visible. If an account is deleted, 
it is stated that it takes about a month to delete information, although “some” information 
may still exist for 90 days. Data that cannot be solely linked to a user’s account, like group 
postings or messages to other users, will not be deleted.  
2.2.2. Information Disclosures and Facebook Search 
The next section in the policy is titled “Sharing and finding you on Facebook”. This 
section first details the controls a user can employ to restrict access to their information 
sharing. As explained earlier, a user can select the audience of certain posts (including status 
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updates, photo uploads or check-in's
27
). As shown in the image below, the audience can be 
defined as public, friends or a custom audience that a user must create by setting up a specific 
friends list, using the Friends Lists feature (as described in the History section earlier). 
 
 
Figure 1: Feature to Restrict Audiences 
 
It is also indicated that although one can restrict these posts, if a user comments on a 
friend’s post, the user cannot control the audience. Additionally, “If you tag someone, that 
person and their friends can see your story no matter what audience you selected. The same is 
true when you approve a tag someone else adds to your story” (“Data Use Policy”). Basically 
this means that “any content that is about you, but controlled by someone else, is out of your 
hands” (Couts). If one does not see a sharing icon (the drop down list in the image above) 
next to a piece of information, then it is an indicator that that information cannot be made 
private (as described earlier, related to what is public information). 
Next, the policy describes how users can be found in the Facebook search 
functionality. If a user has linked his/her email address or phone number to his/her account 
then anyone can search for that user using the email or phone number. This can however be 
restricted with privacy setting controls. In addition, a user can be found via the contact 
importer functionality which uses information from other services like Gmail to find users. 
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 See glossary 
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Slightly out of place here is some information on the Activity Log, a page that allows a user 
to view, edit (content and visibility), or delete some of their Facebook activities. 
The last part of this section details the accessibility of information about a user that 
his/her friends have shared, specifically with regard to tagging, groups, and Pages
28
. A user 
can select a setting that allows him/her to either automatically approve all tags any friends 
make, or for approval before all tags, or select friends who do not need approval. A user can 
elect to join a group, and his/her name will be visible as “invited” until the user opts out. All 
activities on a Page are public. 
2.2.3. Third Parties 
Following this, a section entitled “Other websites and applications” is provided. First 
Facebook’s Platform is explained and discussed. The Platform allows other (outside of 
Facebook) websites, applications and games to access user information. Third-party 
applications have access to all of a user’s public information, including his/her User ID as 
well his/her friends’ User IDs. For any additional information the application must ask for 
explicit access to the information. It is indicated that a user can elect to close off access to 
their public information by Platform applications. This, however, means that the use of any of 
the Platform applications is completely restricted. Facebook also provides a set of controls to 
view a list of applications a user has added and the last time each of these applications has 
retrieved user information. Additionally, here a user can remove applications, review 
permissions a user has given to applications and the audience of stories related to application 
activity. An image of this control is shown below. 
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Figure 2: Application Control Feature 
 
If a user removes an application, it is suggested in this policy that he/she should 
contact the application directly to request deletion of remnant data. This would mean a user 
would have to track down the third party application owners to make such a request. It is also 
important to note that an application is able to access all of a user’s public information if 
his/her friend has installed the application. Additionally, information that a user may have 
only shared with a friend, can also be accessed by the application, if it has requested 
permission from the friend. There exists an additional control that allows a user to restrict the 
type of data available to applications via a friend’s application. An image of this control is 
shown below. 
 
            
Figure 3: Control Access via Friends' Application 
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In addition to applications, another way Facebook links to external entities is by 
allowing users to log into other websites with their Facebook credentials. To do this 
Facebook gives the website the user’s User ID. 
As described in the history section earlier, the Social Plugin is yet another way that 
Facebook interfaces with external websites. When a user or non-user visits one of these 
websites, Facebook logs information regarding this visit (including user name, IP address, 
browser, visit time) (Couts). This logging is performed through the installation of cookies on 
a user’s computer (to be described in more detail shortly). This data is kept for 90 days 
maximum, after which any elements that allow it to be associated with a specific user are 
removed. 
One last Facebook/third-party collaboration is the Instant Personalization. If a user is 
logged into Facebook and browsing one of the chosen partner websites, that website can 
access all the public information of the user. This service, like the previous ones mentioned 
can also be turned off but again, the other website needs to be contacted directly to request 
data deletion. However, the first time one of the websites is visited, a notification informing 
of the Facebook partnership appears. Here a user can immediately elect to turn off Instant 
Personalization, in which case the website is required to delete all user data it may have 
already acquired straight away and may not access any more data at a later date. The policy 
also asserts that any partner websites must enter into an agreement with Facebook protecting 
users’ personal data. 
The last part of this section states that by default a user is searchable in all online 
search engines, but can elect to turn this off. 
2.2.4. Advertising 
The next section of the policy details information concerning Facebook advertising. 
Facebook performs three different kinds of advertising: Personalized Ads; Sponsored Stories; 
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and Facebook content. Facebook asserts that personal information is never shared with third-
party advertisers. Information is only shared once “we have removed from it anything that 
personally identifies you or combined it with other information so that it no longer personally 
identifies you” (“Data Use Policy”). Sponsored Stories occur as a result of the activities of a 
user’s friends (e.g. liking a product or service, or “RSVPing” to a commercial event) and 
appear in a designated advertising space on the side of a Facebook page. Facebook may 
advertise its own features in the same way it uses sponsored stories. This policy also 
mentions Facebook advertisements that are “paired with social actions your friends have 
taken”. It is not clear how this is different to Sponsored Stories, however unlike Sponsored 
Stories, a user can choose to opt out of appearing in these kinds of advertisements. 
2.2.5 Tracking Technologies 
A section titled “Cookies, pixels and other system technologies” is covered next. Here 
cookies are explained as “small pieces of data that are stored on your computer, mobile phone 
or other device” and pixels as “small blocks of code on web pages that do things like allow 
another server to measure viewing of a webpage and often are used in connection with 
cookies” (“Data Use Policy”). Local storage is described as an “industry-standard” 
technology that works in a similar manner to cookies but has the ability to keep more 
information. A few brief examples of the uses of these technologies are listed, such as to 
speed up page loading and navigation on the Facebook site, to track the use of Facebook 
features. It is then stated that third party websites that integrate with Facebook may use 
cookies as well. These technologies may be blocked by changing browser settings but this 
will affect the use of Facebook and the other websites. 
The final section in this policy is titled “Some other things you need to know”. Here it 
is first stated that Facebook “complies with the US-EU and U.S-Swiss Safe Harbor 
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Frameworks
29” with regard to the “collection, use, and retention of data from the European 
Union”. This section also indicates that Facebook may keep and share user information if 
they have “good faith belief that the law requires” it. Additionally, user information may be 
shared with “the people and companies that help us provide, understand and improve the 
services we offer”. Only a few examples of these people or companies are given, but it is 
stated that these entities may only use the information in ways allowed by the Data Use 
Policy. 
It is then indicated that a user may have access to and rectify most information that 
Facebook stores. A downloadable copy of personal information is also available. It is also 
stated that “We do our best to keep your information secure...We try to keep Facebook up, 
bug-free and safe, but can't make guarantees about any part of our services or products”.  
Changes to the policy will be publicised on the Data Use Policy page and on the 
Facebook Site Governance page. It also states here: “If the changes are material, we will 
provide you additional, prominent notice as appropriate under the circumstances”. If changes 
are made for purposes other than legal or administrative, then users have seven days to make 
comments requiring any changes. Voting for a change will be allowed if more than 7 000 
comments are made regarding this change. If more than 30% of registered users vote, it will 
be binding. 
2.3. Why Privacy Violations Occur 
With the historical and current context of Facebook’s attitude and actions towards 
privacy established, this section will now endeavour to explain how and why privacy 
violations on Facebook have occurred and in which ways Facebook is responsible for these 
violations. This will be done by making use of both the social and institutional privacy 
                                                          
29
 US-EU and U.S-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks are programmes that ensure American organisations 
processing or storing data of users from the EU or Switzerland comply with the data protection regulations of 
the EU (European Commission’s Directive on Data Protection) and Switzerland (Swiss Federal Act on Data 
Protection) respectively (“Main Safe Harbor Homepage”). 
46 
 
definitions established in the previous chapter. In some instances certain Facebook features 
are responsible for eroding both institutional and social privacy. However, first an analysis of 
social privacy violations occurring on Facebook will be provided.  
2.3.1. The Architecture of Online “Public” 
With the understanding that people do in fact require privacy in public as established 
in the previous chapter, it is necessary to tackle exactly how the “public” that exists in the 
online Facebook environment is different to real-world public. This will reveal why privacy 
invasions occur with regard to the conception of social privacy, which requires that the 
diverse range of contexts existing on Facebook remain preserved by appropriate separation.  
The first fundamental difference between online and offline public is related to the 
architecture of physical space. In the real and corporeal world, there exist structural 
boundaries that people are immediately aware of and that enable an amount of privacy 
despite being in public (Boyd, “Facebook’s Privacy Trainwreck” 14). For example, a wall 
can hinder the audibility of a person’s voice (Peterson 16). Yet in the realm of online social 
networks “one can be an [observer] being physically present; one can communicate 'directly' 
with others without meeting in the same place. As a result, the physical structures that once 
divided our society... have been greatly reduced in social significance”(Meyrowitz i).  
Additionally, different physical spaces have different social norms. For example, one 
behaves differently in a library than in a bar because: 
The Physical separation of social situations is a by-product of the properties of the 
corporeal world. Walls, roofs, and fences not only keep intruders out, they define 
specific audiences or communities within which social norms operate, and make it 
easy to see where and to whom information flows (Peterson 15).  
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The lack of physical or tangible markers distinguishing different social situations leads 
directly to a collapsing of contexts, which, as contextual integrity (and the social privacy 
conception upon which it is based) asserts, allows privacy invasions to occur. 
A further analysis of the News Feed controversy mentioned earlier provides an 
example of this context collapse and reveals why the introduction of this new feature in fact 
became so controversial. In her paper “Facebook’s Privacy Trainwreck Exposure, Invasion, 
and Social Convergence”, Danah Boyd provides an excellent analogy between the News 
Feed controversy and a real-world example. Here she asks the reader to “Imagine that you are 
screaming to be heard in a loud environment when suddenly the music stops and everyone 
hears the end of your sentence. Most likely, they will turn to stare at you and you will turn 
beet red” (14). Boyd explains that similarly many Facebook users were continuing with their 
activities on Facebook in the belief that unless someone was specifically choosing to monitor 
their profile regularly, their actions would remain relatively obscure to the rest of their 
Facebook friends. The sudden and unexpected introduction of the News Feed created a huge 
shift in the environment and the conception of public within which users were interacting, 
and as such resulted in significant objection from users. In the offline world, often privacy is 
assumed as the default because the publication and dissemination of information requires 
effort as a result of physical constraints. In the online context of social networks, the very 
opposite is the case. What was once “private-by-default” is now “private-through-effort” 
(Boyd and Marwick 9), and with the introduction of the News Feed this was even more the 
case. Users had to actively restrict each post and action subsequently to ensure privacy. 
2.3.2. Invisible Audiences 
In addition to the absence of an architectural separation of social contexts on 
Facebook, there are more features of the online environment that create a significantly 
different version of “public” and thus contribute to further collapsing of contexts. Boyd and 
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Marwick identify four specific features that radically reconstruct this environment. They are 
“persistence, replicability, scalability, searchability” (9). “Persistence” indicates that online 
(and specifically Facebook) activities remain stored on servers for indefinite lengths of time. 
As seen in Facebook’s privacy policy, unless a user actively deletes his/her account, his/her 
personal data will be stored on Facebook’s servers indefinitely. In addition, if a user does 
delete his/her account, all data about him/her controlled by his/her friends or for example on 
public Pages will remain. Recall the account from the previous chapter, in which the tabloid 
article containing the embarrassing photograph and name of a student still appears five years 
later in Google search results. “Replicability”, implies how commonly and easily data is 
copied from its original context and “scalability”, how quickly data may be spread to wide 
audiences. Lastly, “searchability” represents the immediate accessibility of data via search 
engines. As indicated in the privacy policy, all users’ profiles are searchable both on online 
search engines, unless the control to switch this off is changed, and additionally via the 
Facebook search functionality. 
The result of all these features is that any information disclosed on Facebook can 
draw audiences that may not have been anticipated at the time of revelation. This is what 
Boyd and Ellison term “Invisible Audiences” (3). Because one cannot anticipate all the 
possible eventual audiences of particular activities on Facebook, the number of potential 
contexts in which any piece of data may be viewed is unbounded and so once again, contexts 
converge and violations are felt, as illustrated by the case studies presented in the previous 
chapter. In addition to the invisibility of potential future audiences, although a user may have 
some awareness of who his/her Facebook friends are (and may also have privacy controls set 
to limit his/her audience of friends), at the time of disclosure there is no immediate and 
tangible indication of every friend with access to the disclosure, nor a friend’s particular 
response to such a disclosure (Boyd, “Facebook’s Privacy Trainwreck” 16). Without this 
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essential feedback, implications of every information revelation may not be present in a 
user’s mind and additionally, because a user may not be aware of a particular audience 
reaction, any necessary adjustments to remedy resulting conflicts are lost. This may be 
exacerbated by the fact that very often self-disclosure on Facebook happens impulsively. 
Solove asserts “because you can’t see or touch your audience, because you blog in the 
solitude of your room, in front of your computer late at night, it doesn’t seem like 
exhibitionism. There’s no bright spotlight. It’s just you and your computer” (The Future 199). 
So in addition to the fact that the online world lacks the architectural indicators that guide our 
information revelations, this realm also lacks the necessary “social heuristics” (Peterson 18).  
It is important to acknowledge at this point the existence of the Facebook Friends List 
that was mentioned in both the history and privacy policy sections. By setting up specific lists 
of friends one is in fact able to limit the audience at the time of posting and thus have better 
visibility of the audience. However, as a particular list may grow - in 2011 about 2 million 
friend requests
30
 were accepted every 20 minutes on Facebook across the world (Hepburn) - 
an awareness of the exact people in the list may be difficult to maintain, thus blurring the 
visibility of audiences.  
Chris Peterson points out further shortcomings of Friends Lists by first asserting that 
this feature remains “chronically underused” (31) and as mentioned in the history section 
earlier, the first iteration of the Friends Lists feature had been adopted by only 5% of users 
(Scott). Peterson states that Facebook does not emphasise strongly enough that Friends Lists 
can be employed for privacy protection, and that Facebook does not make it easy to use this 
feature efficiently. However, at the time Peterson wrote this, in order to create a particular list 
a user needed to manually add each friend out of a potentially large number of friends. Since 
Peterson’s assertions of these important points, the Friends Lists feature has been improved to 
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add the smart lists as described earlier. The existence of the automatic lists as well as the 
suggestions of friends to add to the “close friends” list does in fact facilitate the process of 
audience limiting. However, Facebook could do more to emphasise the benefits of employing 
this feature and the question of whether it is still underused remains. In a survey conducted in 
June 2012, it was revealed that out of 104 people only 27% were adopting the Friends Lists 
feature (Couch). 
2.3.3. Social Convergence 
The early lack and subsequent underuse of the Friends Lists feature helps to explain 
the continuing existence of another argument raised against Facebook that maintains its role 
in contributing to the collapsing of contexts or “social convergence” (Boyd, “Facebook’s 
Privacy Trainwreck” 15). Often, the reason why audience invisibility is a problem is because 
of the existence of multiple disparate audiences. Because on Facebook one may be friends 
with one’s grandmother, one’s work colleagues and one’s close friends, the convergence of 
all social contexts is rife. In addition to the flattening of one’s social world that occurs on 
Facebook, it is very common for people to have mere acquaintances as friends, what Boyd 
terms “weak ties” (“Facebook’s Privacy Trainwreck” 18). Gross and Acquisti also observe 
that “social networks are both vaster and have more weaker ties, on average, than offline 
social networks” (3). 
Despite Zuckerberg’s claims that having more than one identity is disingenuous and 
deceitful, it is in fact very common for people to have different personas and behaviour 
relevant to different contexts and subject to distinct audiences. In the real world one has a 
complex and highly structured set of social connections – “each connection involves different 
levels of exposure and different ways of sharing information. And while we may share 
information freely among one social circle, we may not want information to bleed between 
the different social circles we occupy simultaneously” (Solove, The Future 202). Solove 
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refers to many sociologists, philosophers and psychologists when stressing that we are 
“complex, multifaceted” beings and thus “ we express different aspects of our personalities in 
different relationships and contexts” (The Future 69)31. However, on Facebook one’s social 
network is greatly simplified and the “nuanced barriers to information flow” are removed 
(The Future 202). From Zuckerberg’s statements insisting on the integrity of one identity, it 
is clear that this is an intentional design of Facebook. 
Although the progress of the Friends Lists feature does allow for more separation of 
contexts there may still be a limit to the extent to which distinct lists can capture the nuances 
and changing characteristics of real life relationships. “Adding ‘FriendYouDontLike’ to a 
controlled vocabulary will not make it socially complete; there’s still 
‘FriendYouDidntUsedToLike’” (Grimmelmann 1186). With this example, Grimmelmann is 
emphasising the difficulties in trying to reduce a rich range of real life relationships to a set of 
discreet lists controlled by a limited range of technical interface features.  
Furthermore, Facebook insists on users having only one account that correlates with 
their real life identity, so users are additionally limited to separating contexts by having 
separate accounts for particular contexts. Facebook goes to somewhat extreme measures to 
ensure real identities are used. In 2011 famous author Salman Rushdie’s account was 
deactivated and Facebook demanded Rushdie submit proof that the account was real. Once 
Rushdie had provided a copy of his passport, Facebook reactivated his account, but insisted 
that the account name be changed to Ahmed Rushdie, as Salman is his middle name 
(Gaylord). It is clear that Zuckerberg’s philosophy of an open society corresponds with 
Facebook users having one account each. However, the fact that Facebook can validate the 
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 Solove refers to William James, a philosopher and notable psychologist, who asserts that both young people 
and adults behave differently around different people. He refers to sociologist Erving Goffman, explaining his 
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also refers to Arnold Ludwig, professor of psychiatry, and philosopher Hannah Arendt when addressing the 
myth that the private self if more genuine 
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information provided by users against their real life identities, means that advertising can be 
directly targeted at users. 
Even though Friends Lists may help control the audiences of our disclosures, as 
acknowledged in the Facebook privacy policy, there still remains a limit to the control a user 
has over the audience of comments on friends’ posts or public Pages and groups. 
Additionally, a user cannot control the privacy settings nor the disclosures of his/her friends. 
For example, a friend can tag a user in a photograph, and although the user can choose to 
remove the tag, that photograph still remains. An exacerbation of this loss of control arises as 
many people are able to tag a particular photograph. Furthermore, it is also very possible for a 
user’s friend to copy, and disseminate to wider audiences, a post intended only for that user’s 
friends. This appears to have been the case with Shaheen Dhada as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Violations occur when a user may have different expectations of privacy to those of 
his/her friends. Additionally, as revealed in the previous chapter
32
 a substantial amount of 
informational insight can be inferred from the cumulative data of one’s friends. Because of 
the existence of weak ties (as mentioned earlier) on Facebook, it is even more likely that a 
mismatch of privacy expectations and behaviour may occur between a user and his/her 
Facebook friends (Grimmelmann 1175).  
2.3.4. Changing Contexts and Instability 
It is important to be cognisant of the fact that when Facebook first started it was 
limited to just the Harvard network. This made it somewhat implicit that the college context 
remained intact allowing contextual integrity to be naturally preserved (Peterson 32). 
However, because of the rapid pace of development of Facebook and the many (often 
unexpected) changes put into place by Zuckerberg (as indicated in the history section), this 
preservation of contexts has been drastically shattered, with users sometimes left in a state of 
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 Recall Grimmelmann’s report on a study where researchers could deduce the age and nationality of a user of a 
social network based on the details of the user’s friends (Grimmelmann 1173) 
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shock and indignation (for example, the case of Beacon). Facebook is now open to everyone 
and exists across the world, covering a large number of contexts in different countries, 
sometimes resulting in severe consequences, as evident in the case studies from the previous 
chapter.  
The kind of instability described above is in itself a significant reason why many 
privacy violations are felt on Facebook. In addition to contexts colliding at a single point in 
time, from one period to the next, the change in various features can cause contexts to 
unexpectedly change. As Grimmelmann explains in reference to contextual integrity: “once a 
site has established a social “context” with specific informational “norms of flow,” it 
transgresses those norms by changing the structure of informational flow” (1169). When 
Beacon was introduced, users were surprised to see information that they had expected to 
remain in one context suddenly moved to an advertising context. This also happened earlier 
with the introduction of the News Feed, when users’ expectations of information visibility 
were abruptly broken.  
As described in its Data Use Policy, Facebook has the right to make changes at any 
time to any of its features. What is quite disconcerting is the visibility and notification of 
these changes. As pointed out, changes to Facebook’s policy will be publicised only on the 
Data Use Policy page and on the Facebook Site Governance page. It does say that “If the 
changes are material, we will provide you additional, prominent notice as appropriate under 
the circumstances”. However, what constitutes a “material” change is not described or 
specified in the documentation.  
As was discussed using the Beacon and News Feed controversies as examples, this 
kind of instability on Facebook may have dire consequences for social privacy. However, 
with regard to institutional privacy, volatility is problematic as well. Firstly, in terms of the 
safety of users’ personal data stored on Facebook servers, it is quite possible that with so 
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many dynamic code changes, the protection of data may be jeopardised (“Security 
Safeguards”). According to Grimmelmann, such incidents have occurred in the past (1170). 
What makes this even more disconcerting is the fact that in its policy, with reference to data 
security, Facebook states that it cannot make “guarantees about any part of our services or 
products”. With regard to the definition of institutional privacy established in the previous 
chapter, it is of fundamental importance that the safety of personal data is maintained and that 
a user be assured of this. Secondly, a user may decide to disclose information on Facebook 
with the knowledge of its initial use. However, if Facebook then suddenly changes its policy 
to entitle it to use that data for an entirely different purpose, according to the definition 
established, this constitutes a violation (“Further Processing Limitation”). Furthermore, the 
requirement of “Further Processing Limitation” also emphasises the need for clear and 
explicit notice and consent for any changes to data use. As already pointed out here, it is not 
clear what conditions allow for change notifications to be placed in a prominent place outside 
of the Data Use Policy.  
2.3.5. Privacy Policy 
The Data Use Policy in itself is problematic in terms of institutional privacy as well. 
As indicated, the length of the policy is a protracted 8 700 words, an intimidating document 
to tackle and longer than the U.S. Constitution which is 4 543 (Bosker). As pointed out 
earlier in the description of the policy, there are a number of vague statements about the exact 
use of user data and often only a few examples are given of the use (seen in the general use of 
data section, the use of cookies, and the sharing of data with third-party services). If 
Facebook can afford to use so many words in this policy, it should most certainly be able to 
explicitly and objectively list the exact use of data. According to the institutional definition of 
privacy, a user should know the exact use of his/her data.  
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Additionally, in “Saving Facebook”, Grimmelmann summarises a number of surveys 
that have shown that users rarely read Facebook’s privacy policy and if they do, often don’t 
understand most of what is written in it (1182). Boyd additionally questions why a user’s 
understanding of privacy settings has to be through the “abstract process” of trawling through 
the privacy policy, which is “removed from the context of the content itself” (“Putting 
Privacy Settings”). As required by the institutional privacy conception, data practices are to 
be open and transparent (“Openness”). This is certainly not the case with the lengthy, vague 
and at times confusing state of the Data Use Policy, despite the fact the policy is written in 
relatively simple, non-legalistic language. 
The analysis of this privacy policy has revealed that there are several more issues 
which are problematic for institutional privacy. Perhaps most obviously is the sheer extent of 
personal data Facebook has access to as revealed in the Data Use Policy. As established by 
the institutional privacy requirements it is important that the scope of data a company may 
collect should be limited (“Purpose Specification”). The fact that Facebook’s large data 
collection is all stored on one server is also problematic for security reasons, especially in 
light of the risks of identity theft described in the previous chapter. Although up to this point 
Facebook itself has not deliberately used user data in any particularly malevolent manner, it 
is stated in the policy that Facebook may reveal data for law enforcement purposes. It is not 
clear what circumstances this covers exactly, so the potential for Facebook or government 
and law enforcement, to abuse this store of user information exists
33
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 Although in America the Stored Communications Act restricts the government from forcing Internet Service 
Providers to reveal electronic information it stores (Ward 566). In South Africa, The Regulation of Interception 
of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act 70 of 2002 “makes it illegal for 
any authority to intercept communication without the permission of a judge designated to rule specifically on all 
interception applications in South Africa.” This covers information an Internet service provider may be storing 
(Swart). 
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2.3.6. Data Subject Participation 
The fact that user data is centralised and owned by Facebook, means that the “Data 
Subject Participation” requirement should be vigorously maintained. Facebook has improved 
its policy when it comes to data deletion, as now when a user deletes his/her account, 
according to the policy, all data will be deleted. However, the shortfall here is that once again 
data controlled by a user’s friends will remain. Additionally, for the deletion of any data held 
by third-party websites/applications, a direct and explicit request for this deletion needs to be 
given to the websites/application developers concerned. This process may not seem obvious 
to a user and with the large amount of third party applications available, it may be very 
difficult to keep track of such data leakage. Furthermore, as indicated, applications may 
access a user’s data if that user’s friend installs the application. In this case a user may not 
even be aware of such an application accessing his/her data in the first place. Unless a user 
deletes his/her entire account there also exists no easy way to delete large amounts of data at 
a time, instead each piece of information needs to be removed tediously one at a time. These 
issues conflict with the requirement of “Data Subject Participation”, as users should be able 
to easily delete any of their data. “Data Subject Participation” is also violated by the fact that 
the policy again rather vaguely states access to “most” data without any explicit indication of 
what “most” covers. In 2010 an Austrian law student, Max Schrems, decided to request a 
copy of all his Facebook data from Facebook directly. He received a document that was 
1,200 pages long, but it still did not contain all of his information (Solon). Schrems 
subsequently filed a number of complaints against Facebook. Soon after, Facebook instituted 
the data download tool as indicated in the Data Use Policy. However, according to Schrems, 
this only provides access to 23 out of 57 categories of data that Facebook owns (Solon). 
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2.3.7. Default Settings 
For many of the issues raised above (both social and institutional), Facebook often 
asserts that their provision of controls (like the Friends Lists) implies that they actively care 
about privacy. Somewhat contradictorily, as mentioned previously, Zuckerberg has said that 
privacy as a social norm has disappeared and that people are now naturally changing to want 
to reveal more information. However, it is imperative to acknowledge in what way Facebook 
is in fact responsible for and encouraging such information disclosure and apparent changes 
in social norms. Solove asserts the ability of the architecture of websites to influence people’s 
behaviour and the significant power of default settings (The Future 200). Throughout the 
analysis of Facebook’s privacy policy it is very clear that although controls exist, the default 
state is always that information is open to the public. When a new user joins Facebook, 
his/her profile is by default open to the public, and he/she has to actively go through each 
privacy control to change this. Throughout most introductions of new features, the default 
was to share information publicly. For example when Facebook allowed user profiles to be 
accessible via online search engines, the default was that this would be the case and to control 
this, one would have to actively opt out (Boyd and Hargittai). Looking once again at the 
News Feed introduction, the default state of the Facebook environment was changed “from a 
‘pull’ to a ’push’ environment overnight” (Peterson 20), meaning that it then became the 
norm for information to be widely and freely disseminated, as opposed to its previous state 
where it was somewhat contained within a user’s discrete profile. 
The state of default settings is imperative in guiding the behaviour of users as 
extensive research has shown that people rarely change defaults (Boyd and Hargittai) – “most 
people find it easier to accept a default choice made on their behalf regarding a putative 
decision than to change that choice, even if the default choice is less advantageous to them 
than changing that choice” (Waldo, Lin, and Millett 76). Peterson describes a study on 
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residents of Iowa which consisted of two parts. In the first part subjects were requested to 
indicate if they wanted their organs donated (if they died in a car accident) by ticking off a 
box in a form. Here 42% of subjects ticked the box. In the second part, subjects were asked to 
indicate if they did not want their organs donated by ticking the box. In this case only 12% of 
subjects ticked the box, leaving more than double the number of people from the previous 
case apparently happy with donating their organs (Peterson 23).  
The result of Facebook defaults is that users are led to share more and more 
information, thus making both social and institutional privacy infringements more likely. 
When one considers Zuckerberg’s frequently expressed desire for openness and information 
sharing as described earlier, and the additional advertising pay-off Facebook receives from 
increased information disclosure, it appears that these defaults are very much intentional. 
When assessing Zuckerberg’s personal philosophy, it is not clear exactly how much 
of this push for increased information revelation is motivated by the advertising gains of 
Facebook’s massive data store. As indicated by accounts of various people (Kirkpatrick, 
Boyd, Sandberg), it does appear that Zuckerberg is genuinely fanatical about his vision for an 
open society, with people having one transparent and homogeneous identity. Whether or not 
Zuckerberg is using this zealotry as a disguise to commercially exploit Facebook users’ data, 
the fact is that Facebook does benefit hugely from its advertising revenues, and Sandberg was 
hired explicitly for this purpose. With Facebook now accountable to its shareholders, the 
need to take advantage of its user data is even more significant. What is important to note 
regarding the details of how violations occur, is that although many claim (including 
Zuckerberg himself) that people no longer care about privacy and that the social norms 
regarding privacy have drastically changed, as this paper has shown, expectations are mostly 
the same. What is different is the environment in which these social interactions now occur: 
“Privacy is in a state of flux not because the values surrounding it have radically changed, but 
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because the infrastructure through which people engage with each other has” (Boyd and 
Marwick 26). Facebook is in many ways responsible for this change in the online 
environment – an environment which causes conflicts from collapsed contexts on many 
different levels; one which centralises and controls users’ personal data in uncertain and thus 
discomforting ways; and one which encourages maximum information revelation through its 
default settings.   
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Chapter Three  
With the conceptions of privacy already established and the analysis of Facebook 
completed, this chapter will assess the success of Diaspora* as an example of an alternative 
social network to Facebook. First it will be explained what Diaspora* is and how it functions 
as a social network. A history of the somewhat turbulent two-year development of this social 
network will be given, indicating the context in which the project started, specifically in 
relation to what the climate of opinion around Facebook was at the time. Additionally, the 
focus will be on an explanation of the motivations and ideals of the founders of Diaspora*. 
An assessment will be given of how Diaspora* successfully tackles some of the Facebook 
issues elucidated in the previous chapter, and the ways in which it helps to preserve both 
institutional and social privacy. Finally, it will be shown where Diaspora* is unsuccessful in 
resolving these issues. 
3.1. Diaspora*  
The Diaspora* social network is fundamentally different from Facebook and most 
social networks that preceded it, because it is a distributed or federated social network. 
Distributed social networks are based on a decentralised network structure that allows users 
to the choose from a range of social network providers, in the same way one may choose an 
email service provider and still be able to communicate with those using different email 
service providers (Esguerra). On a centralised social network like Facebook, if a user wants 
to see another profile, the user sends a request to a central server. The server will then take 
the data from that profile (which is housed on the server) and then forward it to the user. In a 
distributed network, there is no central server, and communication occurs directly between 
users or between a number of different host servers (Zhao). 
Before Diaspora* emerged there already existed other distributed social networks, and 
since Diaspora* started many more have emerged. Three predecessors to Diaspora* which 
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still exist currently are BuddyCloud, founded in 2007 (“ Company Information on 
BuddyCloud”); StatusNet founded in 2008 (Wauters), and OneSocialWeb founded in 
February 2010 (Krynsky). Although the coding languages, network architecture and protocols 
of each of these social networks are very different, all three offer federated social networks 
with privacy control features (“Comparison Distributed Social Networking”). Just after 
Diaspora* began acquiring funding, Friendica was established (Byfield). Friendica is 
currently still running, and has successfully established a number of features that Diaspora* 
aimed to achieve (including integration with Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, StatusNet and even 
Diaspora* (Zhao),(“The Internet Is Our Social Network”) ). The question as to why 
Diaspora* received the attention it did, when many working options already existed, will be 
answered by tracing its development. As will be discussed shortly, Diaspora* happened to 
arise at a propitious time with regard to Facebook’s privacy controversies. When the New 
York Times published a story about the project and its founders, Diaspora* “was introduced 
to the masses” (Wauters, “OneSocialWeb”). For these reasons, Diaspora* was chosen as the 
comparative social network for this paper. 
A distributed network - and specifically Diaspora* - means that the  network is not 
stored in one place (Grippi, Salzberg, Zhitomirskiy, Mei, et al., “Diaspora* Means a Brighter 
Future for All of Us”). The Diaspora* software was created to be installed and run on a user’s 
server/computer (referred to as a “pod”), thus allowing the user’s personal data to be stored 
on his/her own computer and under his/her control. The user is still able to interact with other 
users of the network in the same manner as on centralised networks like Facebook, the 
difference occurring in the backend communication protocols between pods.  
Additionally, if a user does not have the capacity or skills to install the software on 
his/her computer and create his/her own pod, he/she has the option of joining one of many 
“community pods”. These are pods that are set up by individuals and have the capacity to 
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store many users’ data. There are currently34 60 community pods, housed in many different 
countries, including the United States, Greece, Spain and France (Morley). Each pod can host 
a variable maximum number of users, with one pod hosting a maximum of 15 000 users 
(Bleicher). It is then the responsibility of the pod host to keep his/her server running and 
maintain software updates.  
David Morley, one of the pod hosts, maintains a web page that lists all the available 
pods and provides statistics about the pods including pod location, user rating, and percentage 
of pod “uptime” (how often the servers have been reliably running). The Diaspora* founders 
hoped for pod hosts to start running their pods on different kinds of business models, creating 
a heterogeneous landscape of interlinked social networks (Bleicher 57). One pod host:  
could charge users US $5 per month to encrypt all their messages, while the 
host of My-seed.com could provide a free service using advertising as done on 
Facebook. diasp.org could extend invitations only to engineers, while 
Diaspora.lordgandalf.nl could offer a Lord of the Rings theme and games. But 
because all pods built using Diaspora’s source code and standards speak the 
same language, users on different pods are still findable and approachable 
(Bleicher 57). 
Another difference between Diaspora* and Facebook is the fact that Diaspora* is 
open source
35
. The project was open source from the start but primarily run by its founders. 
As of 27 August 2012, Diaspora* became an entirely community driven, open source project 
when its founders handed it over officially. The story of its development from May 2010 to 
August 2012 will follow.  
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 Open source software is “software that is developed, tested, or improved through public collaboration and 
distributed with the idea that it must be shared with others, ensuring an open future collaboration” (Rouse, 
“What Is Open Source Software (OSS)? - Definition from WhatIs.com”) 
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3.2. History 
3.2.1. The Seed 
Diaspora* was created after its four founders, Max Salzberg, Daniel Grippi, Ilya 
Zhitomirskiy, and Raphael Sofaer, were deeply inspired by a talk given by Eben Moglen in 
February 2010 (Liu). Eben Moglen is a Columbia Law School professor as well as the 
founder, director-counsel and chairman of the Software Freedom Law Center (Pinto). The 
talk Moglen gave at New York University was entitled “Freedom in the Cloud: Software 
Freedom, Privacy, and Security for Web 2.0 and Cloud Computing” (Sevignani 600).  
In this talk, Moglen spoke out directly against Mark Zuckerberg stating: “Mr 
Zuckerberg has attained an unenviable record. He has done more harm to the human race 
than anybody else his age" (Moglen). Moglen went on to criticise how the Web had changed 
from an open, distributed network into a restricted environment of surveillance, levelling 
some of the blame at Mark Zuckerberg, stating that “he turned it into a structure for 
degenerating the integrity of human personality, and he has to a remarkable extent succeeded 
with a very poor deal. Namely, ‘I will give you free Web hosting and some PHP doodads, 
and you get spying for free all the time’” (Moglen). Moglen warned that many of us are 
blindly sacrificing our privacy in exchange for the convenience of handing our information to 
centralised companies (Grippi, Zhitomirskiy, Salzberg, and Sofaer, “Kickstarter Pitch”).  
He then raised the key question that mobilised the founders, as described in the 
Diaspora* blog: “why is centralization so much more convenient, even in an age where 
relatively powerful computers are ubiquitous? Why is there no good alternative to centralized 
services?” (Grippi, Zhitomirskiy, Salzberg, and Sofaer, “Kickstarter Pitch”). With the 
urgency emphasised by Moglen’s statement that “every day that goes by there’s more data 
inferences we can’t undo. Every day that goes by we pile up more stuff in the hands of the 
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people who got too much” - the four students realised that they had to “set out to fill the hole 
in our digital lives” (Grippi, Zhitomirskiy, Salzberg, and Sofaer, “Kickstarter Pitch”). 
In addition to understanding the initial impulses behind Diaspora* it is essential to 
contextualise the environment at the time of Moglen’s speech, specifically in relation to what 
was happening around Facebook. As mentioned in the previous chapter, after a series of 
privacy controversies and outcries, in December 2009 Facebook had made a privacy setting 
change which meant that a number of user details that were previously restricted by default 
were now public and available to search engines. As described previously, the outcry was 
large, resulting in the Electronic Privacy Information Center filing a complaint with the FTC 
(Schwartz). 
Fuelled by the rising frustrations with Facebook and instigated by Moglen, the four 
students set out to create a better social network – “the privacy aware, personally controlled, 
do-it-all distributed open source social network” (Grippi, Zhitomirskiy, Salzberg, and Sofaer, 
“Kickstarter Pitch”). 
3.2.2. Initial Ideals and Intentions 
Salzberg, Grippi, Zhitomirskiy, and Sofaer decided to bring their plan to fruition and 
so posted a video pitch to the crowd sourcing funding website Kickstarter on 23 April 2010 
(Bleicher 58). The intention here was to fund their “summer distraction” project (Liu). In this 
video and their subsequent blog posts, the students expressed their own frustrations with 
Facebook. In addition to their obvious discontent with the fact that Facebook owns all its 
users’ data, they also expressed their aggravation with the fact that if users were dissatisfied 
with Facebook’s privacy policy, they could delete their account but then would be cut off 
from interacting with the rest of their Facebook friends (Bleicher 57–58).  
The nature of the distributed network not only meant that users could feel secure 
owning their personal data, but with community pods “as soon as it becomes public that a 
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company is exploiting the data of the users of its pod, they move away and the company is 
dead (in that sector). So the product shifts from you being the product to the software being 
the product” (“ Client Side Encryption”). The founders additionally aimed for Diaspora* to 
perform like a social network aggregator so that “it would connect to every service you used 
to have for you. For example, your seed will keep pulling tweets and you will still be able to 
see your Facebook newsfeed ” (Grippi, Zhitomirskiy, Salzberg, and Sofaer, “A Little More 
About The Project”). This feature, the developers believed, would free users from being tied 
to one social network. 
3.2.3. Public Reception 
The Diaspora* team aimed to raise $10 000 in 39 days for the project they had 
planned to run over the course of the summer (Bleicher 59). In just the second week after the 
pitch had been posted, the project began to draw a large amount of attention and investment 
from top developers, famous open Internet advocates, and prominent technology investors 
(Weise). Al Gore phoned the team to commend their initiative and after just 12 days, the $10 
000 target had been reached. The media attention followed with interviews with the New 
York Times, the BBC, and many technology magazines (Grippi, Zhitomirskiy, Salzberg, and 
Sofaer, “A Little More Than 24 Hours Left!”). The New York Times piece ended up on the 
team’s home page (Weise). The team blogged on May 31st: 
The sheer number of current supporters is unprecedented on Kickstarter, and 
we are thankful for every last backer. Together, we have struck a chord with 
the world and identified a problem, which needs to be solved (Grippi, 
Zhitomirskiy, Salzberg, and Sofaer, “A Little More Than 24 Hours Left!”).  
The next day, the final day of the fund-raising, the project had garnered $200 641 
from 6474 contributors. This was all before a “single line of code” had been written (Bleicher 
59). 
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The public attention surrounding the project was inextricably linked to the battle it 
appeared to be waging against Facebook, and “ ‘Facebook Killer!’ was the battle cry heard 
around the ‘net, a real-life story of David versus Goliath” (Liu). Days before the Kickstarter 
pitch was launched, Facebook had just announced its introduction of the Social Plugin and 
Open Graph protocol that allowed websites across the Web to be integrated with Facebook, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter. Also, as described previously, this was not well 
received among many privacy advocates - the Electronic Privacy Information Center filed a 
second complaint with the FTC (“Social Networking Privacy”). Users were also “alarmed 
that it could track them beyond their personal pages” (Weise) resulting in a “Quit Facebook 
Day” initiative (Boyd and Hargittai). 
With the pressure on the students to be privacy saviours, they realised they needed to 
get down to programming their solution. Sofaer’s brother was a developer at a software 
consulting company, Pivotal Labs in San Francisco, and because of this connection, the CEO 
offered the team the company’s office space. They began work there in June 2010 (Bleicher 
59). 
By 15 September the Diaspora* code was released to the public. The team posted 
their code to GitHub, the code-hosting website and used the Affero General Public License 
(APGL) to license their software. The APGL meant that the code was open for free use and 
modification, with any subsequent modifications to be released according to APGL too 
(Bleicher 59). The software interface resembled Facebook quite strongly: a user had a profile, 
and could make status updates, post photographs and interact with other users in the same 
way as on Facebook (Weise). The backend however, was very distinct. Because it was such a 
novel infrastructure and possibly because of the students’ limited practical software 
development experience, the released code was riddled with bugs and security flaws (Liu). 
Developers who were previously big supporters of the project referred to it as “Swiss 
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cheese”, an indication of the many apparent security holes (Pincus). Some of the flaws could 
have enabled accounts to be hijacked and users to be added as friends without their consent 
(Goodin). An owner and software developer of a top Japanese software company, stated that 
“the bottom line is currently there is nothing that you cannot do to someone’s Diaspora* 
account, absolutely nothing” (qtd. in Goodin). 
The students took these criticisms constructively and began fixing the mistakes and 
strengthening security (Pinto). At the same time they also started to incorporate new features 
such as Twitter Hashtags
36
 and created their own pod “joindiaspora.com” (Weise).  
In addition to improving the security and adding features from exisiting social 
networks, the students also focused on more ways to improve privacy features that were 
lacking in Facebook. In an August blog post, it became clear that the team were starting to 
focus on issues of social privacy, stating that they were aware of the need to allow 
“contextual sharing”, which they described as an “intuitive way for users to decide, and not 
notice deciding, what content goes to their co-workers and what goes to their drinking 
buddies”. They also acknowledged that it would be a challenging task to cater for in a user 
interface (Grippi, Zhitomirskiy, Salzberg, and Sofaer, “An Overdue Update”). The solution to 
this problem came in the form of a feature called Aspects, similar to Facebook’s then very 
underused and under-advertised Friends Lists feature. Aspects were described as “personal 
lists that let you group people according to the roles they play in your life” (Grippi, 
Zhitomirskiy, Salzberg, and Sofaer, “Private Alpha Invites Going Out Today”). With any 
combination of Aspects (i.e. contact groups) a user can filter who he/she sees in his/her 
activity stream
37
 and restrict the audience for posts. There is no limit to the number of 
Aspects a user may have and contacts can be assigned to multiple Aspects (Holloway). In late 
November these features along with the security fixes were released (Pinto). This release was 
                                                          
36
 Hashtags are tags that provide categories for posts on Twitter (Rouse, “What Is Hashtag?”) 
37
 The Diaspora* equivalent of the Facebook News Feed (described in Chapter Two, History Section) 
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far better received and soon Diaspora* had about 600 000 users, although consisting mainly 
of “distrustful techies and Europeans” (Weise). 
The introduction of Aspects became a fundamental feature in the step towards a 
better, more privacy conscious social network. This became evident in June 2011 when 
Google released Google Plus, its attempt at gaining ground in the social networking realm 
(Halliday). As Liu astutely observes: “Google could still put ads in front of more people than 
Facebook, but Facebook knows so much more about those people. Advertisers and publishers 
cherish this kind of personal information”. One of the key features Google Plus promoted 
were Circles, which were very much the same as Diaspora*’s Aspects. Facebook also 
appeared to respond to the introduction of these features by attempting to improve the 
original underused and little known Friends Lists feature in September, as described in the 
previous chapter. In the Diaspora* blog the team responded to these occurrences, expressing 
their pride that Google had copied their Aspects feature and acknowledging that Facebook 
was finally “moving in the right direction with user control over privacy”; attributing 
Facebook’s move as a response to Google Plus and the growing support for Diaspora* 
(Grippi, Zhitomirskiy, Salzberg, Mei, et al.). Google claims that its ideas preceded Diaspora* 
(Weise) but whether this was true became somewhat irrelevant in light of the failure of 
Google Plus to attract a significant number of users. In February 2012, Google Plus only 
managed to draw users onto its network for an average of 3 minutes over the whole the 
month of January, compared to 7.5 hours for Facebook users (Winter). This indicated to the 
Diaspora* team how powerful the “inertia” of Facebook users would be (Weise). 
Outwardly however, the team seemed to still be focused and idealistic about making a 
distinct change to the online privacy environment. In a blog post, the team announced that 
they had agreed to abide by the Computers, Freedom, and Privacy’s Social Network Users’ 
Bill of Rights that had been adopted at the 2010 conference. The conference was the 
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twentieth annual CFP conference and was held at San Jose State University (“Main Page - 
CFPWiki”). The CFP “is the leading policy conference exploring the impact of the Internet, 
computers and communications technologies on society” (“Main Page - CFPWiki”). The 
Diaspora* post listed the Bill as follows: 
1. Honesty: We will honor our privacy policy and terms of service. 
2. Clarity: We will make sure that our policies, terms of service, and settings are easy to find and 
understand. 
3. Freedom of speech: We will not delete or modify user data without a clear policy and justification. 
4. Empowerment: We will support assistive technologies and universal accessibility. 
5. Self-protection: We will support privacy-enhancing technologies. 
6. Data minimization: We will minimize the information users are required to provide and share with 
others. 
7. Control: We will work toward enabling users to own and control their data and won’t facilitate sharing 
their data unless they agree first. 
8. Predictability: We will obtain the prior consent of users before significantly changing who can see their 
data. 
9. Data portability: We will make it easy for users to obtain a copy of their data. 
10. Protection: We will treat user data as securely as our own confidential data unless they choose to share 
these data, and notify them if these data are compromised. 
11. Right to know: We will show users how we are using their data and allow them to see who and what has 
access to their data. 
12. Right to self-define: We will allow users to create more than one identity and use pseudonyms. We will 
not link them without their permission. 
13. Right to appeal: We will allow users to appeal punitive actions. 
14. Right to withdraw: We will allow users to delete their accounts and remove their data. 
This list, however, was immediately followed by somewhat of a disclaimer, stating that 
the Diaspora* adoption of the Bill was “aspirational”, explaining that they “aspire to have the 
required functionality in place soon [in order to] enforce all these rights, and to this end, we’ll 
use the aforementioned principles to guide our product development from this day forward” 
70 
 
(Grippi, Zhitomirskiy, and Salzberg). Most of this list is relevant to institutional privacy as 
defined in Chapter One, however the “Right to self-define” is relevant to social privacy as 
with the allowance of multiple unlinked identities (something that is not allowed on 
Facebook as mentioned in Chapter Two), one can separate social contexts thoroughly. This 
will be explained further shortly. 
By September 2011, the Kickstarter fund money had run out and Sofaer decided to 
return to school in New York (Liu). Shortly thereafter, Yosem Companys, who had been 
brought on a few months earlier as president of the Diaspora* foundation to help guide the 
development of the project, left abruptly due to “internal strife” (Liu). A release that was due 
for November was unexpectedly called off a few weeks before it was due as the remaining 
team did not feel ready for the release (Weise). Many were starting to question the future of 
the project, and the doubt became evident with the waning of funds and with the Wall Street 
Journal article entitled “Whatever Happened to Diaspora* The Facebook Killer” published 
on 7 November (Liu). The Diaspora* team received one more devastating blow when, on 11 
November
 
, Ilya Zhitomirskiy committed suicide (Pinto). There was subsequently a fair 
amount of speculation in the media, questioning whether the stresses of the project 
difficulties, and the high expectations for the four founders led to Zhitomirskiy’s suicide 
(Chen), with Zhitomirskiy’s mother stating that “I strongly believe that if Ilya did not start 
this project and stayed in school, he would be well and alive today” (Weise). 
Grippi and Salzberg took a break in December but returned in January 2012 with a 
new desire to keep on with the project. Dennis Collinson (previously a software engineer at 
the software company Pivotal Labs) and Rosanna Yau (a graphic and interaction designer) 
joined the project as head of engineering and user experience designer respectively (Weise). 
In June 2012 Diaspora* moved to Y-Combinator, the “start-up accelerator”, to participate in 
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their three month program that had successfully guided many previous start-ups (Dropbox, 
Scribd) (Weise).  
Unfortunately, Y-Combinator was not as successful with Diaspora* and on 27 
August, Grippi and Salzberg announced that they would be stepping down from running the 
project and “giving control of Diaspora* to the community” (Grippi and Salzberg). They 
insisted that they would still play a significant role in the Diaspora* community. In their blog 
announcement, the two stated that: 
Today, the network has grown into thousands of people using our software in 
hundreds of installations across the web. There are hundreds of pods that have 
been created by community members, and it has become one of the biggest 
GitHub projects to date. It has been translated to almost fifty languages, with 
hundreds of developers worldwide contributing back to the project.  
The move to community governance did not, in fact, mean an end to the social 
network. Sean Tilley worked closely with the founders before the handover and is now one of 
the primary people controlling the community project. The project has successfully released 
the next version of the code. This is the version that was previously intended for the 
November 2011 release and which was called off. In a blog post from the 29 October, it is 
clear that community members are still working on the code. The blog post makes specific 
mention of many other existing decentralised social networks, listing: Libertree, TentStatus, 
BuddyCloud, Friendica, StatusNet, and MediaGoblin
38
, and additionally discusses plans to 
make Diaspora* capable of interacting with these social networks (Tilley).  
3.3. Privacy Policy 
The privacy policy of joindiaspora.com (the pod created by the Diaspora* team 
themselves) is still in development (Grippi and Salzberg, “Diaspora* Is Back in Action”). 
                                                          
38
 Libertree, TentStatus and MediaGoblin emerged after Diaspora*. 
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However, the diasp.org is one of the most popular and longest running pods and does have a 
privacy policy, so this will be analysed. Once signed up to this pod, a link to its privacy 
policy is provided. The policy is a refreshing 800 words long, about a
 
tenth of Facebook’s 
Data Use Policy, and like Facebook’s policy is written in an informal tone and without 
complicated legal terms. The policy first describes what information the pod collects, which 
is detailed to be information required for registration purposes. The uses of the information 
are listed: “to personalize your experience”; “to improve our website”; “to improve customer 
service”; “A 3rd party vendor is used for support tickets, when submitting a support ticket 
you are sharing the information you supply and your Browser/IP data” (the vendor’s name is 
listed along with a link to their privacy policy); “to process transactions”; “to administer a 
contest, promotion, survey or other site feature”; “to send periodic emails” (“Disap.org 
Privacy Policy”). It is then asserted that both public and private information “will not be sold, 
exchanged, transferred, or given to any other company for any reason whatsoever, without 
your consent, other than for the express purpose of delivering the purchased product or 
service requested”.  
The policy then explains what security measures are in place to keep data safe. It is 
stated that a number of measures are taken and additionally states that the pod server remains 
in a safe place and that SSH access restriction
39
 with RSA keys
40
 is implemented. This 
section also asserts that all data is transferred via Secure Socket Layer
41
 (SSL) technology. 
An explanation of cookies is given and it is confirmed that the pod uses cookies to 
keep track of user preferences and to gather website traffic data in order to “offer better site 
experiences and tools in the future”.  
                                                          
39
 Secure Shell (SSH) is an “interface and protocol for securely getting access to a remote computer” (Rouse, 
“What Is Secure Shell (SSH)? - Definition from WhatIs.com”).  
40
 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) is an “Internet encryption authentication system” (Rouse, “What Is RSA 
Algorithm (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman)? - Definition from WhatIs.com”) 
41
 Secure Socket Layer (SSL) is a protocol for securing the transmission of messages on the Internet (Rouse, 
“What Is Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)? - Definition from WhatIs.com”) 
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The next section deals with information disclosure to third parties. It is asserted again 
that “personally identifiable information” is not sold, traded or transferred to third parties. 
Outside companies are, however, used to provide data statistics and to measure site 
performance. These parties use “non-personally-identifying information”, that are commonly 
available with web browsers and servers. Some of the data that is included is listed (“browser 
type, language preference, referring site, and the date and time of each visitor request”). The 
data is collected in order to provide insight into visitor use of the pod. It is stated that third 
party companies comply with the diasp.org privacy policy. The name of the third party 
company in use is listed and a link to its privacy policy is provided. Data may be transferred 
if needed to “comply with the law or valid court order, enforce our site policies, or protect 
ours or others rights, property, or safety”. 
The policy then goes on to explain that links to outside party products or services may 
be provided on the diasp.org website but that diasp.org will not be held liable for the policies 
or activities of these sites but does “seek to protect the integrity” of its site. 
Lastly, any changes to the privacy policy will be posted on the privacy policy page. 
The last modification date of the policy is provided (25 November 2011). 
3.4. Analysis 
3.4.1. Successful Solutions 
Now that an overview of how Diaspora* works, its features and its founders’ 
intentions has been provided, an assessment of whether Diaspora* successfully offers a 
privacy improved alternative to Facebook can be given. The most obvious and primary 
feature that Diaspora* boasts is the ability for its users to own their own data. If a user hosts 
his/her own data then none of the requirements established for institutional privacy are even 
needed. However, most current users of Diaspora* do not house their own data and instead 
choose to store their data on one of the community pods. The assumption here is that with 
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regular updates on the pod listing website, a reliable and transparent insight into the 
trustworthiness of pod hosts will be provided. In this case, however, the user would need to 
rely on the privacy policy of his/her selected pod.  
In the case of the diasp.org privacy policy, the collection and use of users’ personal 
data is simply and clearly explained and the safety of data is assured. These are three key 
aspects of the institutional privacy requirements: “Openness”, “Purpose Specification”, and 
“Security Safeguards”. A fundamental aspect of Diaspora* that is clear in this policy is the 
fact that user data is not exploited for advertising purposes and so defaults do not need to 
encourage information revelation as on Facebook. 
Although not mentioned in the policy, one of the features of Diaspora* software and 
therefore universal to all pods, is the ability to download and/or export all personal data from 
one pod to another. This feature fulfils the “Data Subject Participation” feature by allowing 
users full access to and even ownership of their data. The feature appears prominently at the 
bottom of a user’s Account Settings page as shown in the image below: 
 
 
Figure 4: Diaspora* Data Portability 
 
This portability feature in the context of the decentralised network structure empowers the 
user by making pods, and eventually other social networks, accountable for the way in which 
they treat their users and their users’ data, as explained by the Diaspora* team themselves:  
And because your information is yours, not ours, you’ll have the ultimate 
power — the ability to move your profile and all your social data from one 
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pod to another, without sacrificing your connection to the social web. Over 
time, this will bring an end to the indifferent, self-serving behavior that people 
can’t stand from the walled gardens that dominate social networking today. 
When you can vote with your feet for the environment where you feel safest, 
the big guys will have to shape up, or risk losing you (Grippi, Salzberg, 
Zhitomirskiy, Mei, et al., “Diaspora* Means a Brighter Future for All of Us”).  
The levelling of power that portability produces, is extended further by the fact that 
Diaspora* has been created to perform like a social network aggregator. At the moment 
Diaspora* integrates with Tumblr, Twitter and Facebook, allowing a Diaspora* user to post 
to them, and plans eventually to have functionality that allows feeds from these services to be 
pulled too (Grippi, Salzberg, Zhitomirskiy, Mei, et al., “Diaspora* Means a Brighter Future 
for All of Us”).  
So far the ways in which Diaspora* offers a reasonable way to uphold key aspects of 
institutional privacy have been shown. Diaspora* has however, also managed in some ways 
to help maintain better social privacy. The Aspects feature helps to provide this. As explained 
earlier, like Facebook’s Friends Lists feature, this allows for the separation of social contexts, 
and as illustrated in Chapter One, this is an essential aspect of social privacy. Diaspora* 
appears to be more successful in the implementation of Aspects than Facebook is with its 
lists, as it has advertised prominently from the start that they are to be used as a way to 
contextually share information. As soon as a user starts adding friends, categorising can 
begin. 
In addition to Aspects, Diaspora* offers another fundamental feature that assists 
contextual information disclosure by allowing multiple user accounts. A user may also create 
pseudonymous accounts, none of which have to be linked. As shown in the previous chapter, 
Facebook strictly forces users to have only one account and an account that is consistent with 
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all of their real life personal details. With Diaspora*, one can have an account that is relevant 
to one’s work life only and another for one’s social life. With accounts separated in this 
manner, there is far less risk of issues such as one’s employer seeing a compromising 
photograph. As the team blogged, pseudonyms allow “you [to] express yourself candidly, and 
be your authentic self...and this both protects you (if you want to say something your boss or 
your parents disagree with)” (Grippi, Salzberg, Zhitomirskiy, Mei, et al., “Diaspora* Means a 
Brighter Future for All of Us”). The “authentic self” being in stark contrast to the authenticity 
that Zuckerberg appears to push for with his “one identity” statements.  
3.4.2. Shortfalls 
Although Diaspora* has achieved a lot in its attempt at creating an improved privacy 
social network, it is certainly not a perfect one. One of the biggest problems with Diaspora*, 
as the failure of Google Plus indicated, is the fact that Facebook has achieved such a 
monopoly that luring people away from it is a difficult task. This means that if a user does 
decide to opt for Diaspora*, his/her experience of it will be limited by the likelihood that few 
of his/her friends will be on the network. The intentions of the Diaspora* project were such 
that it would eventually allow users to still connect with their Facebook friends but currently 
this has not been implemented (although as mentioned, one can update one’s status on 
Diaspora* and have it update Facebook at the same time). As acknowledged by the team, 
because users on Diaspora* usually did not have many of their Facebook or real life friends 
connected, Diaspora* became a way to socialise with strangers. The team state that: 
The interactions on other networks are built around the assumption that you 
are addressing people you actually know – your ‘friends’... Something entirely 
different is happening on Diaspora*... A diverse, international community of 
people meeting and discussing all sorts of things needs to be thought about 
differently (Grippi, Mei, Tilley, Yau, et al., “DIASPORA* Grows Up.”).  
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The danger of invisible audiences described in the previous chapter seems to be very 
likely in this situation. Although one could possibly assume that people who are on 
Diaspora* currently are privacy conscious, it may certainly not be the case that every user of 
Diaspora* has equal expectations when it comes to privacy. Thus the collapsing of contexts 
that occurs as a result of the potentially limitless number of audiences for disclosures (that are 
exacerbated by the digital age of “persistence, replicability, scalability, searchability”, as 
described in Chapter Two) may be even more frequent on Diaspora*. 
Even with the case of audiences consisting of trusted real life friends, technological 
infrastructure (in this case the decentralisation) and interface design (for example the Aspects 
feature) cannot solve all the kinds of social privacy invasion problems that online interaction 
and information disclosure on social networks can cause. As acknowledged in the previous 
chapter, there is a limit to the kind of nuanced granularity that can be achieved with Aspects, 
as real life human relationships are intricate and diverse and fluctuate over time. This is 
something the Diaspora* team were aware of from the start when they first released their 
code to the public. As they stated in their Developer Release, the team realised that:  
Technology wouldn’t be enough. Even the most powerful, granular set of 
dropdowns and checkboxes will never give people control over where their 
content is going, let alone give them ownership of their digital self (Grippi, 
Zhitomirskiy, Salzberg, and Sofaer, “Developer Release”).  
In addition, on Diaspora*, as on Facebook, it is difficult for a user to control what 
his/her friends disclose or spread about him/her. It is important to realise that there are certain 
privacy diminishing characteristics of online social networking that cannot be solved with 
technical controls or infrastructure alone. 
Institutional privacy may not either be fully conserved in the current state of 
Diaspora* because there are also risks in allowing anyone (e.g. people inexperienced with 
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storing large amounts of user data, or without the financial capacity to do so) to host a pod. 
Aside from the podupti.me website, where reviews and performance details are provided for 
each pod, there is currently no initial or further due diligence performed as to the intentions 
and abilities a particular user may have for hosting a pod. It is true that accountability may 
rise with users’ easy ability to leave a pod if dissatisfied, but currently all pods run for free so 
there is not much incentive for a host to keep users data strictly safe. Additionally, there is no 
easy access to view each of the pod’s privacy policies on the podupti.me website. In order to 
view diasp.org’s privacy policy, one needs to create an account with the pod first. 
Furthermore, the fact that inexperienced pod hosts may be creating their own privacy policies 
may also mean that the quality of such policies cannot be guaranteed. 
The alternative of signing up to a pod is of course the option of configuring one’s own 
computer to be the host. Unfortunately, despite plans to make this simple for users, it is 
currently extremely complicated. Before one can even start installing the Diaspora* software 
there is a long list of other applications and services that need to be installed (a total of 11) 
and then the instructions for the installation that follow are about four pages and 1598 words 
long (“Notes on Installing”). The advantages for institutional privacy specifically would be 
significant if this process was made simpler. 
Although the portability feature offers many advantages with regard to data 
ownership and empowerment, complications may arise as Grimmelmann points out, “if you 
and I are contacts, is that fact your personal information or mine? Giving me the “ownership” 
to take what I know about you with me to another site violates your privacy” (1193). When 
the data that is generated on social networks is as a result of interactions and relationships 
with other people, determining strict lines between data ownership boundaries may not be a 
simple process. As Grimmelmann asserts further “thus, while data portability may reduce 
vertical power imbalances between users and social network site, it creates horizontal privacy 
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trouble” (1193). Furthermore, if data is continuously moved from site to site, it may also 
become less secure. 
Perhaps one of the primary shortfalls of Diaspora* was the failure of its founders to 
provide a robust solution to the issue of sustaining a social network service that is both free 
and does not mine its users' data. For this reason, it makes sense for Diaspora* to run as a 
community project, but it still does not completely solve the issue of sustainability for current 
pod hosts. As more pod hosts emerge and/or if the hosting process is made simpler, the load 
of users could be spread sufficiently to allow for services to remain free for users and cheap 
to run for hosts. 
Unfortunately, many saw the stepping down of the founders from the Diaspora* 
project as an admission of the failure of the entire project. It is true that many grand claims 
were made and aspirations pronounced at the start of the Diaspora* project both by the 
founders themselves as well as the initial public support, and that many expectations were not 
met. However, this enthusiastic reception does highlight the strongly felt need for this kind of 
service. Furthermore, this chapter has shown that Diaspora* successfully introduced and 
extended worthy solutions to the problems of both institutional and social privacy. The 
developments of the community coding contributions have been promising only three months 
down the line, so there may be a lot more to come from Diaspora*. If the integration of 
Diaspora* with all existing social networks is solved and the complexities of individual 
software installation is simplified as planned in the community blogs, Diaspora* may step 
even closer to being a robust and popular solution. Additionally, if integration is achieved, it 
may be the case that distributed social networks will: 
Take over slowly, like ivy enveloping the brick halls of Harvard University. 
At first, open-source projects such as Diaspora* will grow steadily and 
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haphazardly, all the while tweaking their technologies, working out standards, 
and syncing with each other (Bleicher 82).  
The fact that many distributed networks are currently running is a promising 
indication that soon there may exist a diverse, heterogeneous and equal social networking 
landscape in which all network owners are more accountable to their users, and where most 
networks facilitate both social and institutional privacy with their settings and controls. 
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Chapter Four  
This chapter presents a summary of the conclusions from the previous chapters. 
Recommendations for further solutions to privacy issues occurring on social networks, which 
were not successfully accounted for by either Facebook or Diaspora*, will be made. Finally, 
suggestions for future avenues of research in this realm will be provided.  
4.1. Social Network Privacy 
Two conceptions of privacy (social privacy and institutional privacy) relevant to the 
context of online social networks were developed, primarily employing Helen Nissenbaum’s 
proposed framework of contextual integrity.  
Social privacy is the term used to capture the kinds of violations that occur as a result 
of users disclosing information about themselves on social networks and others further 
disclosing their information. The development of a conception of social privacy, as supported 
by contextual integrity, was fundamentally based on the importance of upholding 
expectations of the context in which information revelation occurs. When violations of social 
privacy occur on Facebook, it is as a result of the collision of contexts that cause such 
indignation and criticism. Social networks are fundamentally an extension of real-world 
interactions and, specifically on Facebook, occur primarily between real-world friends and 
acquaintances. Despite Zuckerberg’s claims of privacy norms changing in ways that indicate 
people want to reveal more personal information, this report has shown that people still in 
fact, have the same expectations for privacy on social networks as they do in the real world. 
These expectations explain the outcries that have occurred as a result of various changes in 
Facebook’s privacy policy. This indignation perhaps was most overtly seen through the 
substantial publicity of Diaspora* and its subsequent branding as the “Facebook Killer” or 
the “Anti-Facebook”, as described in Chapter Three. For social privacy to be maintained, a 
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social network needs to preserve an appropriate separation between the rich diversity of 
social contexts.  
The institutional privacy definition was used to deal with the kinds of issues arising 
from the harvesting of users’ personal data by Facebook and its exploitation of that data for 
commercial purposes. In accordance with contextual integrity, this definition was developed 
using a legal conception of fair information practices. The requirements therefore needed to 
uphold institutional privacy were based on South Africa’s soon to be enacted Protection of 
Personal Information Bill. The principles in the Bill are based on well accepted practices 
developed around the world and are:  
 “Accountability”- which concerns the responsibility of institutions for compliance with 
the Bill 
 “Processing Limitation”- which ensures information is processed fairly and lawfully  
 “Purpose Specification”- which limits the scope of the uses to which information may be 
put by an organisation 
 “Further Processing Limitation”- which limits the use of information to those initially 
identified (which need to be defined specifically and explicitly) and for which consumers 
have given consent 
 “Information Quality”- which ensures institutions preserve the quality of information 
 “Openness”-which asserts that information processing practises are to be transparent 
 “Security Safeguards”- which means institutions are to ensure information is safe from 
“risk of loss, unauthorised access, interference, modification, destruction or disclosure”  
 “Data Subject Participation”- which ensures individuals should be allowed to correct or 
remove any incorrect or obsolete information (Badat). 
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4.2. Facebook 
Chapter Two endeavoured to apply the conceptions of privacy to Facebook to assess 
how Facebook enables violations of both social and institutional privacy, and to what extent 
Facebook can be held accountable for these actions. This was performed firstly by tracing the 
development of Facebook over the last decade, while trying to pinpoint Mark Zuckerberg’s 
intentions, and secondly, by analysing Facebook’s Data Use Policy and its technical privacy 
control features. From this critical analysis, it was concluded that Facebook violates social 
privacy by collapsing and colliding contexts in the following ways:  
 Social networks lack the physical and architectural constraints that exist in the offline 
world that allow for revelations made in public to remain discreet and for contexts to be 
separated. With the introduction of News Feed, Facebook created a further merging of 
contexts so that information revelation that used to be “private-by-default” became 
“private-through-effort”.  
 Four fundamental features of the online realm and inherent in Facebook (persistence, 
replicability, scalability, searchability), enable “invisible audiences”. This implies that, 
because the number of potential future audiences for a piece of disclosed information may 
be boundless, contexts once again may collide.  
 Social contexts converge as a result of the common lack of divisions within a user’s 
Facebook friends collection, which additionally often consists of many “weak ties” 
(casual acquaintances). Although Facebook does currently offer the Friends Lists as a 
way to limit information disclosure to particular audiences, it does not advertise this 
feature sufficiently as a tool for maintaining privacy. Furthermore, the fact that Facebook 
insists that users each have one account in accordance with their real life identities, limits 
users’ ability to interact contextually. In light of Zuckerberg’s insistence that the world 
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should be more open and transparent and his repeated assertion that having more than one 
identity is deceitful, this social convergence appears to be intentional. 
 Violations often occur on Facebook as result of the disparity between a user’s privacy 
expectations and those of his/her friends. Because on social networks one has little 
control over how one’s friends choose to disclose information, this disparity is especially 
problematic.  
 Finally, contexts have converged on Facebook, as a result of the numerous fundamental 
structural changes it has made over the years, from the introduction of features such as 
News Feed to its significant transformation from an enclosed Harvard network to a 
worldwide open network.  
This kind of instability due to continual changes is problematic for institutional 
privacy too because of the risk to data safety it may cause. For example, Facebook also adds 
in its policy that it cannot make “guarantees about any part of our services or products” 
(which violates “Security Safeguards”). Instability also means that the initial data use agreed 
to by users has changed numerous times over the years, with data now being used for 
commercial purposes, and spread to many third parties (which violates “Further Processing 
Limitation”). Furthermore, the Data Use Policy does not make it clear exactly which changes 
users will be explicitly notified of, and this also violates the “Further Processing Limitation” 
requirement, which asserts the need for explicit notice and consent for any changes.  
Both institutional and social privacy suffer as a result of Facebook’s complicated, 
excessively long and vague privacy policy, which leaves users unaware and confused as to 
the extent of their exposure to both Facebook and the rest of the Web. In terms of institutional 
privacy, it could be said that the “Openness” requirement is violated by this lack of 
transparency. 
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The Data Use Policy also reveals the large amount of user information to which 
Facebook has access. The range of types of data is wide and may in fact be problematic in 
term of the “Purpose Specification” requirement, which aims to restrict the scope a company 
may have to utilize personal data. Furthermore, the fact that the data is centralised on 
Facebook servers may be problematic for security reasons and also because it may increase 
the potential for abuse by both Facebook and government or law enforcement. 
Due to the fact that Facebook owns and stores all its user data, the requirement of 
“Data Subject Participation” should be thoroughly maintained. However, it was shown that 
because of the data leakage to all the third party websites and applications with which 
Facebook integrates, the task of deleting data is challenging and tedious. Furthermore, users 
have no control over the data that their friends may have disclosed. The Data Use Policy also 
reveals that a user may access “most” of his/her data, but it is not at all clear what this covers. 
The most fundamental privacy violation, for which Facebook can be held directly 
accountable, despite its claims to improve its privacy policy and controls, is the state of its 
default settings. As shown in Chapter Three, the power of the default is such that it can 
directly influence people’s behaviour. Documented research has shown that people will often 
allow a choice (including critical life decisions such as organ donation) to be made on their 
behalf, by trusting the default option. In the case of Facebook, this technique specifically 
encourages more information disclosure, as the default settings are such that disclosures are 
always open to the public. Zuckerberg claims that such increased information revelation is 
due to shifting norms but at the same time, he is also seemingly fanatical about fulfilling his 
vision of an open and transparent society, and therefore in fact pushes for a change in norms. 
As explained in Chapter Two, it is not clear whether Zuckerberg is motivated by commercial 
gain as much as by his obsession with transparency, as it appears that this zealotry is genuine. 
In light of Sandberg’s belief that Zuckerberg provides privacy controls as a “means to an 
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end” (qtd. in Kirkpatrick 195), and the additional advertising pay-off that Facebook receives 
as a result of increased disclosures (and for which Sandberg was specifically hired), this 
report concludes that these default settings are definitely intentional, as are many of the 
structural changes introduced over the years that have caused numerous forms of context 
convergence. 
4.3. Diaspora*  
In contrast to Facebook’s commercial exploitation and ownership of user data, 
Diaspora* emerged. Chapter Three assessed Diaspora*’s solution to the violations occurring 
on Facebook. This was done by tracing the history of Diaspora*, focusing on the founders’ 
motivations and inspirations and by assessing the features that Diaspora* offers specifically 
to improve both social and institutional privacy. In addition to what Diaspora* offers in terms 
of an alternative to Facebook, it is imperative to acknowledge the media popularity and 
support it garnered as the “Anti-Facebook”, indicating a significant discontent with the state 
of Facebook at the time, and again reinforcing that people do in fact care about privacy.  
It was shown that Diaspora*’s primary decentralised feature solves most of the 
requirements needed to uphold institutional privacy, as a result of the ownership and control 
of data it allows. This is most true in the case of users running their own pods. Because of the 
data portability that Diaspora* facilitates, this may also be true to some extent in the case of 
users signing up to other pods as users can easily access, delete and correct all of their data, 
thus fulfilling the “Data Subject Participation” requirement. Because Diaspora* aims to 
integrate seamlessly with other social networks, it also extends its distributed model outside 
of its own network, thus reducing the monopoly a particular social network may have.  
Diaspora* solves some social privacy issues as well through its proactive advertising 
of its Aspects feature to allow for contextual information disclosure, and through its 
allowance of multiple pseudonymous accounts per user. Allowing multiple accounts 
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acknowledges that users should legitimately have many different facets to their identity, and 
should be allowed to compartmentalise these facets. Furthermore, the problem of excessive 
self-disclosure of information is less likely to occur on Diaspora*, as a result of its default 
settings that assume that information is to be restricted. 
Chapter Three also revealed the ways in which Diaspora* does not solve issues of 
social and institutional privacy successfully. It was pointed out that the danger of invisible 
audiences on Facebook is still an issue with Diaspora*. This danger may be made even worse 
on Diaspora* as, according to the Diaspora* team themselves, many users have connected to 
strangers across the world. In addition, as on Facebook, there is the high risk that a user’s 
expectations of privacy may not match those of his/her friends, and there is still nothing 
allowing a user control of what information his/her friend discloses about him/her or from 
stopping a friend from copying and disseminating his/her information. Furthermore, there is a 
limit to the extent to which technical controls like Aspects (and Friends Lists on Facebook) 
can represent the rich social relationships that exist in real life.  
In terms of institutional privacy, Diaspora*’s current distributed model can be 
problematic in light of the risks of allowing anyone to host a pod. There is no concrete 
assurance that a pod host has enough experience or capacity to keep information secure. With 
the current inaccessibility to each host’s privacy policy and the lack of monetary incentive for 
hosting a pod, there is not much assurance with regard to a host’s intentions either. This 
however, could be avoided if the current complexities of hosting one’s own pod are 
simplified.  
Additionally, although the portability feature is useful, it may also cause 
complications in determining exactly what data belongs to a user and what data belongs to 
his/her friends, when most of social network data is generated by interactions and 
relationships (i.e. data that is shared between users). The “Security Safeguards” requirement 
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may also be at risk as a result of data constantly being moved from pod to pod, as portability 
allows. 
The difficult challenge of competing against Facebook was emphasised by the failure 
of Google Plus, which drew users for an average of 3 minutes over the whole of the month of 
January, compared to 7.5 hours for Facebook users (Winter) – a clear indicator of the strong 
pull that Facebook has acquired with its users. This issue could be solved by Diaspora*’s 
plans to integrate completely with all social networks. The fact that Diaspora* is now a 
community run project means that it can now run for free without having to sustain the 
Diaspora* founders, as all further developmental work is volunteered by a fairly large 
community of developers. As long as enough pod hosts emerge and/or individual pod hosting 
is made simpler to spread the load of users sufficiently, Diaspora* could remain a free service 
that does not need to mine its users’ data or push for more privacy violating disclosures to 
sustain itself. This paper has shown that Diaspora* successfully introduced and extended 
some solutions to both institutional and social privacy, and very importantly brought the 
concept of an alternative distributed social network to more people’s attention than the other 
distributed social networks that preceded it. If Diaspora* fulfils its plans to fully integrate 
with all social networks, there may soon exist a more level playing field for users to chose 
from, and one that does not need to conflict with a single man’s fanaticism or a single 
company’s commercial interests. 
4.4. Further Solutions for Maintaining Privacy   
As indicated above, there are still outstanding privacy issues despite the 
improvements that Diaspora* brings. As stated in Chapter One, in America the FTC’s Fair 
Information Practices principles, which guide institutional privacy, are currently only 
guidelines in America and not enforceable by law. In South Africa, the case is the same for 
fair data practice guidelines as the Protection of Personal Information Bill has not yet been 
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enacted. For American users of Facebook, this means that Facebook is often not held 
accountable for its data practises. The data of users outside of America and Canada (which 
obviously includes South African users) is controlled by Facebook Ireland Ltd. (“Data Use 
Policy”). Because Ireland is part of the European Union, these data practices are regulated by 
the EU Data Protection Directive (“Legal Procedure Against ‘Facebook Ireland Limited’”), 
which, as stated in Chapter One, enforces principles very similar to those of the South 
African Protection of Personal Information Bill. These principles are enforced by EU law, so 
technically users in these countries (which include South Africans) have better means to hold 
Facebook accountable. However, as the organisation “Europe vs. Facebook” has made clear, 
there are still a number of violations to the Data Protection Directive that Facebook is 
committing (“Legal Procedure Against ‘Facebook Ireland Limited’”). “Europe vs. Facebook” 
has filed several complaints with the Irish Data Protection Commissioner over the years, 
some of which have resulted in audits by the Commissioner who then requested a number of 
Facebook changes (Tate). Without the protestations of this organisation however, Facebook 
may have continued not to be held accountable for its practices despite the EU regulations. 
Therefore, I believe that for institutional privacy to be improved on social networks, data 
protection regulations need to be enforced more strictly, and by the law.  
 However, the law could be used successfully to tackle social privacy issues on social 
networks as well. For example, if someone disseminates information that another user 
disclosed to a specific Facebook audience, that person should be held liable. Furthermore, as 
Solove asserts, and as pointed out in Chapter One, if someone discloses personal information 
about another user that is of no use to public interest, that person should be held accountable 
by the law in the same manner that defamation law holds people accountable. Solove also 
points out that in America, employers are legally obligated to reveal to job applicants if any 
information resulting from a credit reporting check (via credit agencies) directly influences 
90 
 
the applicants employment chances. This law is in place so that a job candidate may be able 
to explain any inaccurate or incomplete facts. The same law could be extended to the 
increasingly common practice of employers conducting informal background checks by 
looking at candidates’ Facebook profiles (Solove, The Future 203). 
Although the law may control the use that others make of personal information, one 
could argue that it cannot directly limit the extent of information a user reveals about 
him/herself. However, the law could enforce the settings of social networks so that (as on 
Diaspora*) the default setting restricts publication to the most limited audience, and 
information disclosure to third parties (for example Facebook’s third party apps, Social 
Plugin etc) are “opt-in” as opposed to “opt-out”. 
Another solution to this issue of self-disclosure, as proposed in most of the research, 
is education, and particularly education directed at teenagers who have been shown to reveal 
more information than most other age groups. Grimmelmann stresses that “targeted efforts to 
explain a few key facts about social-network-site privacy in culturally appropriate ways could 
help head off some of the more common privacy goofs users make” (1141–1142). Perhaps 
schools could run informal workshops, explaining how to successfully employ the various 
controls Facebook currently offers. These workshops could also provide some of the many 
examples of cases where self-disclosure resulted in dire consequences as discussed in Chapter 
One. 
As elucidated earlier, both Facebook and Diaspora* suffer from the issue of invisible 
audiences. No matter how many technical controls such as Aspects and Friends Lists are 
available or how concise and clear a privacy policy may be, a social network needs to provide 
privacy both through its interface controls as well as through its environment. In addition to 
employing appropriate defaults as a way to improve this, a social network can do a lot more 
in terms of the feedback it provides to its users. For example, Danah Boyd suggests that when 
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a user posts a photo on Facebook, while selecting a specific audience, the user could be given 
the option of directly viewing a list of all the people contained in that audience. She states 
that: 
When I post a photo in my album, let me see a list of EVERYONE who can 
view that photo. When I look at a photo on someone's profile, let me see 
everyone else who can view that photo before I go to write a comment. You 
don't get people to understand the scale of visibility by tweeting a few privacy 
settings every few months and having no idea what "Friends of Friends" 
actually means (Boyd, “Putting Privacy Settings”).  
Peterson points out that feedback could also be provided by allowing users to see who 
has viewed their various disclosures (35). This feature is and was present on a number of 
social networks already including Friendster and LinkedIn. However, this feature could then 
paradoxically conflict with the privacy Facebook currently does afford to a user’s browsing 
of other profiles. This clash of privacy rights highlights the complexities of maintaining 
privacy on social networks. As indicated, the primary feature of social networks is to 
facilitate interactions between people, and as indicated on both Facebook and Diaspora* 
these interactions occur between many users around the world. Satisfying all expectations for 
privacy is a difficult and intricate endeavour. 
4.5. Further Research 
4.5.1. Other Distributed Networks 
This paper was limited to the analysis of only Diaspora* as an alternative to 
Facebook. It was chosen particularly because of the publicity it received and because it 
emerged at a time in Facebook’s history that was especially controversial in terms of privacy 
issues. However, as indicated in Chapter Three, there are currently a number of other social 
networks that are also based on the distributed model. Further research analysing these social 
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networks, and a comparison between these networks and Diaspora* to determine if they offer 
an even more successful solution to Facebook would be of benefit.  
4.5.2. Further Facebook Changes 
Due to Facebook’s rapidly changing state, the investigation of Facebook was limited 
to extend no further than June 2012. Further research could take into account the subsequent 
changes. Most notably since June 2012, Facebook acquired facial recognition technology, 
that allowed it to recognise users from uploaded photographs that had not yet been tagged, 
and then suggest tags for these photographs (Sengupta and O’Brien). Soon after this feature 
was instituted, as part of an investigation into Facebook’s data practices, the European Data 
Protection Commissioner (DPC) based in Ireland, recommended that Facebook disable this 
feature (Lunden). Facebook subsequently disabled the feature but stated that it would bring it 
back for Europeans on terms the DPC agrees with and did not state on what conditions it will 
restore the feature for America and Canada (Sengupta and O’Brien). Another significant 
change for Facebook is the further alteration it has made to its Data Use Policy, the most 
significant of which is the retraction of users’ ability to vote on new changes in the future 
(Kerr). This has once again raised concern among advocacy groups such as the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center. Facebook has also added some new controls that could improve 
social privacy, such as the ability for a user to request other users to remove photographs of 
him/herself but at the same time, Facebook once again removed existing controls that helped 
maintain privacy (such as the control that stops other users searching a user on Facebook) 
(Taylor). Now almost a decade since Facebook’s inception, these changes appear to continue 
to follow the same general pattern observed in Chapter Two – a pattern of introducing some 
privacy controls, while at the same time also introducing often radical changes that lead users 
to reveal more information at the cost of privacy. As already discussed, this again appears to 
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confirm Sandberg’s view that Zuckerberg provides some privacy controls as a temporary 
measure towards his long term goal of “radical transparency”. 
4.5.3. Google 
In terms of the investigation of online violations of privacy, the practices of Google 
also demand a thorough critical analysis. The centralised nature of Google, and the huge data 
store it has on a wide range of user data collected from about 60 services (including for 
example: search activities, email messages, calendar information, and Google Plus social 
network related information) may be problematic for privacy too (Arthur). In a manner 
similar to Facebook’s transition from a small college network to an international corporation, 
Google has evolved into a company that looks quite different from when it started. In 2009 it 
was reported that Google dropped its “Don’t Be Evil” motto (Foremski) and now appears to 
be very much like Facebook in its churning of users personal data to money through 
advertising. Furthermore, Google also appears to be exploiting its user data at the cost of 
privacy, and in 2012 it was reported that 30 European data protection commissioners 
criticised changes Google had made to its privacy policy in March 2012 (Arthur). One of the 
major changes criticised was the fact that Google merged the data collected from its 60 
separate services into one single data store. The criticism also pointed out that “the company 
was storing, without consent, cookies and data about sites people visited for between 18 
months and two years” (Arthur). 
Like Facebook (since its Initial Public Offering in May 2012), Google also appears to 
be under pressure to meet shareholders’ expectations. While both Internet giants offer “free” 
services to users, it seems that instead of the traditional form of monetary payment for these 
services, users now pay with their personal data and, often unknowingly, with their privacy 
too. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
When I first began the research for this report, I had a strong but at the same time not 
very succinct sense that privacy violations were occurring on Facebook. As the research 
progressed and as presented in this report, it became distinctly clear exactly what, why and 
how violations occur. This report endeavoured to apply the general framework of Helen 
Nissenbaum and the wide ranging work of Solove to the specific issue of social network 
privacy. Previous work on which this research was based (particularly the work of Danah 
Boyd, James Grimmelmann and Chris Peterson) that was more specific to social network 
privacy than Nissenbaum and Solove, tended to focus on social privacy violations only; while 
the legal context dealt mostly with issues suited to institutional privacy. However, with the 
guidance of Kate Raynes-Goldie, this paper acknowledged the distinction between social and 
institutional privacy and tackled both thoroughly in the assessments of Facebook and 
Diaspora*. The conceptions developed here helped to determine exactly how violations occur 
on Facebook, and then additionally helped to determine whether Diaspora* offered a 
successful alternative to Facebook. Additionally, these conceptions, have guided further 
requirements necessary for the preservation of privacy on social networks, and I believe can 
be used to assess effectively the practices and conditions of other online social networks in 
the future. 
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5. Glossary of Facebook Terms 
Check-in: When a user checks-in, they post information regarding their current location onto 
Facebook. This is usually done through one’s mobile device using GPS technology to 
determine the current location (Watkins). 
Comments: Comments on Facebook are opinions or expressions posted by other users in 
response to a status update or photo by a particular user (Rouse, “What Is Facebook?”). 
Friend request: A user adds a Facebook friend to his/her list of friends by sending a friend 
request. A user does this by selecting the profile of another user and selecting the “add” 
option. The other user then receives this invitation and can choose whether to accept or 
decline (“Friend Definition”). 
Friends list: A Facebook user can view his/her collection of friends in the form of a list. The 
collection is therefore referred to as a friends list (“Friend Definition”). 
Friends-of-friends: This term is used to explain the relationship a user has to the friends of 
his/her Facebook friends. Facebook uses it as a category of friends one may have and is used 
with the Friends Lists feature explained in Chapter Two. 
Group: A Facebook group is a page used by organisations, businesses or groups of people 
with common interests to coordinate activities (Rouse, “What Is Facebook Group?”). 
Like: A Facebook user expresses their approval of something on Facebook (a post, a status 
update, a comment or a photo etc) by clicking a like icon (Rouse, “What Is Facebook ‘Like’ 
Button?”).    
Page: A Facebook Page is a public profile for organisations and businesses. Pages acquire 
fans when a user likes the Page. Pages operate in the same way user personal profiles do. 
This means Pages can have features like status updates, photo uploads and events, and users 
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who are fans of the Page see these activities in their News Feeds (Rouse, “What Is Facebook 
Page?”). 
Page Likes: This is the list of Pages that a user has become a fan of (i.e. the user has liked 
the Page). 
Tag: A tag is a hyperlink that links posts like photos, status updates  and comments to a 
specific user’s profile page (“Tagging”). 
Status update: A status update is a feature that allows users to post usually brief messages to 
their profile pages expressing their thoughts. The status update also appears  in users’ friends 
news feeds (Rouse, “What Is Facebook Status?”).  
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